Kant On The Possibility Of Moral Law:

’The starry heavens above me and the moral law within me" are the two things over which Kant thought hard for several decades. In his theoretical philosophy, Kant made very promising speculations over the starry heaven; and in his practical philosophy, he offered an all-round elucidation of the moral law within his mind. But what on earth is the moral law in his mind? How is his moral law possible? How did he himself explain or argued for its possibility? Different Kant scholars all over the world have different opinions over these problems nowadays.Kant’s ethical theory represented by the moral law has always been the object of fierce opposition by some scholars and of whole-hearted support by some other scholars. Nowadays, although the research in this field is very fruitful, some fundamental problems concerning the possibility of his moral law still remains unclear. Firstly, as far as the question of how is Kant’s moral law possible is concerned, different scholars already have different opinions. For a fairly long time since World War Two, this question has been interpreted as why the moral law as a categorical imperative is valid, though nowadays there are a few scholars who have begun to distinguish the validity, reality, possibility and the necessity of the moral law and treat them as different questions. Second, how did Kant himself explain or argue for the possibility of his moral law? Different scholars also have different opinions over this issue. Nowadays, scholars all over the world hold that Kant explained the possibility of his moral law via the theory of intelligible world (also named as double world or the two aspects of mankind) and the doctrine of the fact of reason. But what are the structures of these two arguments? How did Kant argue for that? Different scholars have very different opinions over these two issues. Third, different people also have different opinions as to whether Kant’ explanation or arguments are successful or of a failure. In the past, most scholars hold that Kant’s arguments failed, but nowadays some scholars maintain that Kant’s explanations are relatively successful. These two opinions are quite different. The reason why different scholars have so different opinions is mainly because different scholars have different understanding of Kant’s explanation or argument as well as their specific structure.The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate into the possibility of Kant’s moral law with the question of how Kant’s moral law is possible as its core. There are mainly two reasons why we choose to investigate into this problem:firstly, this problem is of great theoretical importance for Kant’s moral theory; secondly, different scholars have different opinions and even very conflicting ideas concerning this issue. Firstly, is Kant’s moral law possible? If it is possible, how is it possible? What are its possibility grounds? These are questions that have been perplexing Kant and Kant scholars for a long period of time. Because if the moral law can be proven to be possible, then the system of duty Kant thereby build on will have a solid foundation; but if the possibility of the moral law cannot be proven, the ethical Kant established thus will just be a building on moving sands and so may collapse any time in the future. Secondly, as far as the possibility of Kant’s moral law is concerned, different scholars still have different opinions up until now. People of different opinions may oppose for various reasons, supporters may try every means to develop Kant’s ideas. Opponents may think that Kant’s moral law is divorced from the reality and cannot be fully realized in modern society, but the supporters may think that his moral law is totally possible and the ethical ideas embodied in his moral law are in the glory of humanity.To make clear how Kant’s moral law is possible, we must make clear three problems:first, what Kant’s moral law is; second, how Kant explained or argued for its possibility; third, whether Kant’s explanations or arguments are successful or a failure. These are the three major problems this dissertation will focus on. The investigation of these problems will be based on the original works of Kant and with the help of second literature, and make full use of different methods such as semantic analysis, text comparison, translation comparison, logical analysis and thought experiment. First, Kant’s moral law is a formulaic sentence, and the semantic analysis of this sentence may reveal and explain many problems. The semantic analysis we will use will begin from the words and phrases Kant use, and then move to the ideas behind them, the meaning they express and the things they refer, and then show these complex concepts and propositions in a more clear way. Second, in a long period of time lasting for several decades, Kant explained the rich meaning of his moral law in many different times. So comparison of the different explanations Kant put forward in different contexts about the same concept or proposition is helpful for better understanding of Kant’s ideas. Third, Kant’s ethical works has been introduced into different countries for a fairly long time, and each of his important works have already have many different translations, comparison of different translations of the same original texts will be helpful to a better understanding of Kant’s thoughts. Fourth, Kant has very thoughtful explanations or arguments for the questions he put forward, but do they make sense? Test of these explanations or arguments with logical method can help us better understand Kant’s ideas. Fifth, the basic feature of thought experiment is purity and idealization, and it can be separated from the limits of real conditions and subjective experience. This dissertation will show the problems that may exist in Kant’s arguments, the critique his argument has to face, and the anti-critique he may put forward.The possibility of Kant’s moral law has been discussed for more than two centuries. Nowadays, most Kant scholars all over the world believe that Kant explained or argued for the possibility of his moral law via the theory of intelligible world and the doctrine of the fact of reason. In addition, some scholars also think that Kant also argued for the possibility or even necessity of the validity of his moral law by practical reduction to absurdity and by resort to inspiration of reason. But we think that in addition to the argument based on the doctrine of fact of reason, there is also an argument based on what may be called the doctrine of transcendental form. This argument is the main argument of the second critique, and it is the most mature argument which Kant has ever put forward. The most important task of this dissertation is to make clear how Kant argued for the possibility of his moral law along this route. This is an entirely new explanation of Kant’s argument for the possibility of his moral law. Why the Kant scholars all over the world seldom notice this argument? We think it is perhaps because most scholars did not pay enough attention to the concept of "the mere legislative form of maxims" Kant frequently mentioned in the third theorem of the second critique. Kant’s works have always be known for its difficulty, this is not only because his ideas themselves are very difficult, but also because Kant has used a set of terms he invented himself which often have particular meanings in his texts.This dissertation mainly consists of six parts. In the introduction, we will first define the main problems to be investigated, the approach to these problems and the method we will use in our investigation, and then we will give a brief introduction of the related literature concerning the possibility of Kant’s moral law since the World War Two. The main question this dissertation attempts to answer is how Kant’s moral law is possible. This question can be further characterized as how is Kant’s moral law possible as a categorical imperative, and this question can be further clarified as three specific problems, i.e. what Kant’s moral law is, how Kant explains or agues for its possibility and whether his explanations or arguments are successful. In the survey of the related second literature, we introduced the most important literature on this issue, including the related works written by the established scholars such as Paton, Henrich, Beck, Allison and Rawls, and also including the many excellent works of the younger generation of Kant scholars written in recent years. The purpose of this survey is to show that when talking about the possibility of Kant’s moral law, most scholars focus the two arguments based on the theory of intelligent world and the doctrine of the fact of reason, and that almost no one talk about or even mention the argument this dissertation will investigate and discuss in great detail.In the first chapter of this dissertation, we will show that in the three ethical works over a dozen years, i.e., The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant characterized the same formulae in his mind for at least12times. There are slight differences in the use of words between each characterization, but the basic meanings of each characterization are very similar or remain the same. So they all can be said to be the different characterization of the same formulae, that is, their basic meanings are all to ask us "to act only according to the maxims that can also hold as a universal law". But on the other side, though the meanings of these characterization are almost the same, Kant named each characterization in different ways, such as the highest principle of morality, the categorical imperative, the formulae of the autonomy of will, the moral law, the first principle of the doctrine of virtue, the formal principle of duty and so on. We will argue that the moral law is just another name or a new characterization of the categorical imperative.The second chapter gives a detailed explanation of Kant’ critique of all the material or empirical practical principles and our conclusion is that although Kant’s critique may seem to be loose, but it has in fact a very strict structure. The specific structure of Kant’s argument can be summed up in the following ways. Any practical principles which presuppose the material of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will cannot be hold as universal and necessary practical laws, because the objects every rational being may desire at different time are not always the same. Even they can sometimes coincide with each other; their coincidences are just accidental and not necessary a priori. Even if every one desires some common objects, they may have different understanding of them. Even if their understanding of these objects is the same, they may experience these objects in different ways. Even if their understanding and subjective receptivity of these objects are the same, they may have different considerations over the priority of each object. Even if their arrangement of the priority of different objects are the same, the means they adopt to realize these object may not be the same, and the maxims as a means to realize these object may also be different. Even if the purpose, means, understanding and receptivity they may have are all the same, some maxims may not hold as universal laws.The third chapter mainly investigates the way in which Kant argue for his transcendental formal practical principle, i.e., the moral law. Kant’s critique of the empirical practical principles have its deep metaphysical root. Although this metaphysical position has difficulties that cannot be easily overcome, Kant set forth a new deduction for the possibility of his moral law with the help of this kind of metaphysical position. From Kant’s critique of empirical principles we can see that only the mere form of maxims can serve as universal and necessary determining ground of the will and that only the practical principles which presuppose the mere form of maxims as the determining ground of the will have the possibility of becoming universal practical laws. There are mainly two reasons why the mere form of maxims can serve as universal and necessary determining ground of the will:firstly, it is of itself universal and necessary; secondly, it can be valid for every rational being in the same way. There are also two reasons why we say that only the practical principles which presuppose the mere form of maxims as the determining ground of the will have the possibility of becoming universal practical laws:firstly, it is because they presuppose the mere form of maxims as the determining ground of the will; secondly, it is because they can be valid for every rational being in the same way.Chapter four is the core part of this dissertation. It explains in detail the specific structure of Kant’s three arguments for the possibility of his moral law; i.e., the argument based on the theory of intelligent world, the argument based on the doctrine of the fact of reason, and the argument based on the theory of transcendental form. The so-called intelligent world argument refers in this dissertation to the argument from the moral law to autonomy and then to freedom and intelligent world; the so-called fact of reason argument is referred to the argument from the fact of reason to pure practical reason and then to the moral law and freedom; the so-called transcendental form argument is referred to the argument form the moral law to the mere form of maxims and then to freedom and universals. These three arguments are interrelated and interdependent on each other, and they can all elucidate the possibility of the moral law in certain ways. The argument based on the postulation of transcendental form has been neglected by most Kant scholars for a long period of time, but it is the most mature argument Kant has ever put forth. This argument is neither based on the theory of intelligent world nor based on the doctrine of the fact of reason. It can elucidate the possibility of the moral law only with the help of the postulation of transcendental form, and thus avoids the ambiguity of the concept of intelligent world and the difficulty in proving the fact of reason to be true.In the conclusion, a tentative attempt at the evaluation is made about whether Kant’s arguments are successful or of a failure. We believe that Kant’s explanation or arguments are relatively clear and successful, because he can be said to have realized his goal of explanation, though this goal undergoes a change or rather a retreat from a proof of the necessity of the moral law to an explanation of the possibility of his moral law. The arguments most contemporary Kant scholars hold to be unsuccessful or of a failure are the arguments based the theory of intelligent world and the doctrine of the fact of reason, but not the argument based on the postulation of the transcendental form. The characterization and clarification of the transcendental form argument in this dissertation may be an important contribution to the research of the possibility of Kant’s moral law.