The Interactive Effect Mechanism And Empirical Research Among Multiple Subjects Of China’s Environmental Governance

China’s overall industrialization process has entered the mid-late stage in recent years. The environmental problems the western countries experienced seem to emerge in China. The data from the environmental monitoring department show that China’s air and water quality has deteriorated shockingly in recent years. Though the central government of China has been paying much attention to the environmental problems, and enhanced the environmental regulation since the beginning of the 1990 s. However, it still failed to control the deterioration of environmental quality. And in some areas ecological environment has even suffered the irreversible damage. Worryingly the environmental pollution will not only affect the human health but also cause disease threats. What’s more, Triggered by enterprise pollution behaviors and poor government environmental performance, the outbreak of environmental group events may bring serious damage to economic society suddenly and extremely. Unfortunately, most researches carried out analysis mainly based on the assumption of government environmental regulation effectiveness, and most of the documents and articles failed to offer systematic, comprehensive and convincing explanation in response to the problem that increasingly stringent environmental regulation policy is still unable to curb the deterioration of China’s environment quality,. This paper is a tentative supplement to previous research.This paper, based on previous research results, proposes series of theoretical hypothesis such as the "promotion drive" and "government preference" and "Rent-seeking" from the perspective of the formal system, informal and recessive system in China’s environmental governance. Based on the logic thread by three body interaction of “local government-local enterprises-local public " in China’s environmental governance, this paper discusses mechanism of the influence that promotion-driven local government exercises on regional macro economic growth through the market segmentation strategy, mechanism of influence that the preference matching between local government and enterprises has on the public environmental benefits through spatial correlation as well as the mechanism that locals push regional green economic growth by reducing cooperation opportunities between local government and enterprises in rent-seeking respectively, and intends to build a logical and rich-contented research framework on China’s environmental governance. According to statistical data of Chinese regional environmental and economic department as well as data of regional industrial enterprises, this paper has carried out empirical test using the method of the latest DEA network model and spatial econometrics model on the basis of relevant theoretical modeling and hypothetic proposition.Based on the historical process of China’s environmental governance and lessons learned in the review, this paper, in the first place, is a detailed assessment of local industrial pollution and industrial carbon emissions in 30 provinces in China. It examines economic cost of environment pollution, the related public welfare loss and the differences in those costs. In this paper, the author also made a tentative effort to discuss the features of the tempo-spatial correlation between economic growth and the potential environment pollution. It is found that the regional environmental quality assessed from the perspective of economic costs greatly differs from that assessed from the public welfare loss, and that the public acceptance of environment pollution is increasing while the intensity of industrial pollution and carbon emission shows a decline on the whole. In addition, the spatial statistical analysis confirms significant spatial correlation of environment qualities in different regions in China, which indicates one complex feature of regional environment governance in China-- the co-existence of coordination and confrontation.Moreover, this paper analyzes how local governments affect the quality of regional economical growth through market segmentation under the promotion incentives. Using a global reference price evaluation of market elements in different regions in China and considering undesirable outputs, such as energy inputs and environmental pollution, this paper assesses the regional economic growth quality in terms of allocative efficiency of resource. In this paper, it is found that market segmentation had a negative influence on the regional economic growth quality in term of allocative efficiency of resources, no matter according to the traditional approach of prices based on geographic proximity or the revised method of global reference price, and there are positive spatial spillover effects. The economic competition strategy of “beggar thy neighbor” not only inhibit on efficiency of resource allocation, resulting in poor economic growth quality, but it also leads to widening gap between the allocation efficiency of resources in varied regions, eventually making itself into an "economy basin" dilemma where its own economic growth quality is damaged.Furthermore, this paper attempts to put forward explanations for the failures of the regulation policy of regional environment through analyzing different combinations of preferences of local governments and enterprises. New models to evaluate the combinations of preferences of local governments and enterprises and the effect of environment pollution on the public health are built in this paper, and provincial panel data and micro panel data from enterprises are all carefully analyzed. The author found that better combination of preference of the local government and enterprises is not only helpful to reduce regional pollution emissions per capita, and it can improve the quality of the environment in other regions through spatial spillover effects. It is also found that better combination of preference will further improve the environmental welfare benefits of the public by reducing the harm of environment pollution on the public health.Finally, this paper discusses whether the public demand for environmental protection will damage the rent-seeking activities between governments and enterprises, force industrial enterprises to increase production through green technology innovation, and eventually realize the improvement of the regional environmental governance performance. It is found that compared with passive factors like environment pollution, the public are susceptible to rational factors for environment protection, such as income, education quality and attention to health. The non-governmental environmental protection actions will force industrial enterprises to undertake green technology innovation, and rent-seeking activities will greatly harm the improvement of the green productivity. When the quantile of green productivity increases, the positive effect of non-governmental environmental protect will also increase. Rational demands for environmental protection have a positive effect on high quantile of green productivity, a negative on low. The paper proves that the prerequisite of the Porter Hypothesis is advanced technology.