Farmers To Participate In The Study Of The Mechanism For Sharing The Proceeds Of The Land Market

Allow farmers to participate in economic growth and share the results of reform and opening-up, the key is to narrow the urban-rural income gap and increase peasants' income. After 30 years' reform and opening-up, the use of land factor and construction of novel peasant-land relationship have great importance of the peasants. Due to the long-term policy and institutional deficiencies, peasants have poor power on the possession of land. As a result, the factor's allocative and substitutional efficiency of land are limited, and the contribution to income is weak, thus weakening the peasants' capacity of using the land to participate in economic growth. Based on the combination of historical and practical methods, this article tries to find a viable mechanism that allow the peasant use the land to participate in economic growth and to share the results of the reform, specially for the present, all the local governments are actively pursuing joint stock-cooperative system on farm land.This paper includes nine chapters divided into five parts.The first part consisting of Chapter I and Chapter II is the foundation and preparation for the whole framework. Chapter I explicates the background, the motive, the cutting point, the technology route and methodology of the research. Chapter II focuses on the researches and literatures on the mechanism of the peasants sharing the returns of land marketization and the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland. Based on the practical demand, In this chapter, the research background and the relative mechanism of the peasants sharing the benefit of the land marketization, as well as the relevant issues on the stock-cooperation system of farmland are discussed through the review.The second part is comprised of Chapter III and Chapter IV, which is the theoretical premise and the fundamental framework of the analysis of this paper. Depending on the historical logics of peasant economy, Chapter III establishes the basic analytical framework of the peasant-land relationship and discusses the basic needs and behavior characteristics of the peasants. Moreover, before the Reform in 1978, the peasant-land relationship and the condition that peasants earn the return from the land in traditional Chinese society are studied in this chapter. Before introducing the neoclassical competitive analysis method, Chapter III clarifies the connotation and historical features of peasant economy that is the self-supporting and self-sufficient household operation and the inherent closure of the land ownership. The marketization was exerting influence in the traditional society, whereas the emergence of Yi-tian-er-zhu (there are plural owners on the same land) indicates the complexity of the peasant-land relationship in the traditional society, and the security and stability are the basic needs of the peasants. According to the behavior logic of peasant economy, the process of marketization of the peasant-land relationship under the social restraint might be an acceptable second-best solution. Therefore, when constructing the mechanism of peasants sharing the benefit of land marketization, it is still necessary to follow such historical inertia. The requirements of the historical tradition on the peasant-land relationship are its capability to safeguard the security of the peasants' land tenure, to increase the positive stimulus for peasants so as to extend the effectiveness and to guarantee relatively fair returns from marketization for peasants.Chapter IV, putting the basic analytical framework of the peasant-land relationship under the restrictions of the national and local interests, further explains the practical needs of the peasants. The peasant' behavior choice of maximization the income based on land returns was more and more restrained and impacted by the national and local interests before the reform and opening-up. Since 1978, because of the restriction on the land marketization, when gaining the factor return, peasants took two-stage decision making behavior. So the land return has limited impact on peasants. However, out of consideration for the national interest, the state implements measures like subsidy and land expropriation which increasingly influence the decision-making and income of peasants. The local government, because of the requirement on the political performance, usually ignores peasants' basic rights and benefits, which obstructs peasants getting benefit from the land expropriation. The game problem among state, local government and peasant is the background and premise for the analysis of mechanism of peasants sharing the returns from land marketization.The third part is Chapter V, focusing on the analysis of experience and implication from Japan. The fact that Japanese rural economy narrowed rural-urban disparity in a relatively short period is greatly attributed to the mechanism that Japanese peasants participate in the process of the sharing returns form land marketization. The Japanese peasant-land relationship primarily pursues the unity of ownership, management and laboring and stabilizes the family-oriented and small-scale mode of operation. In the process of marketization, the peasant-land relationship gradually adapting to the need of economic development, promotes the land circulation. After the world war II, Japanese peasants experienced the changes from yeomen to self-management, then to agricultural operation organization. This process in fact is the process that the Japanese peasants fully enjoy the benefits of land marketization. New tendency and problems such as Population aging, farmers' diversified economy, decrease of agricultural workers, advancing depopulation, abandonment of arable land, the coexistence of scale management and decentralization, appear in Japanese rural areas along with the rapid economical development. Also the rural-urban development disparity tends to be greater. All these changes bring about the further implementation of measures like permission for tenancy of land, corporate agricultural land holding rationalization and community supported agriculture. The implications from Japanese experience are to attach equal importance to legal personalization and collectivization meanwhile to emphasize the non-profitability of the legal personalization, to improve the peasant-land relationship under the cooperation among local government, business entity and peasants, to continuously perfect legal system, to adapt the peasant-land relationship in time, to facilitate the marketization of land and safeguard peasants' benefit from marketization.The fourth part involves Chapter VI, Chapter VII and Chapter VIII, which is the main part of this paper. This part clearly indicates the feasible way to let peasants share the return of land marketization is joint stock-cooperation of farmland. It also analyzes the relevant mechanisms and actual development of peasants using joint stock-cooperation system to share the benefit of land marketization.Chapter VI analyzes the feasibility of joint stock-cooperation of farmland for peasants to share the benefit of land marketization. The practical demands of narrowing the rural-urban income disparity and boosting economical growth require enlarging influence of land factor for the increase of peasants' income, to ensure peasants fully get all the benefit from the land and to form a permanent mechanism to protect peasants' benefit from land marketization. We think that not only from the perspective of historical inertia but also from integration of the practical needs of national and local interests, the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland is the effective way to let peasants share the returns from land marketization. The urgent actual need is to increase the peasants' property income, to raise the proportion of factor distribution especially its primary distribution in the peasants' income structure. The joint stock cooperation system of farmland can carry out this function. This paper establishes the basic analytical framework of relationship between peasants and joint stock-cooperation system of farmland to further justify that the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland can help peasants realize the Pareto improvement in the land marketization. Also the relevant data in Shanghai 1978-2008 are referenced in the paper to demonstrate the feasibility of this system.Chapter VII analyzes the concrete ways and mechanism for peasants to share the returns from land marketization by adopting joint stock-cooperation system of farmland. This chapter mainly involves three aspects: first to identify collective land ownership of joint stock-cooperation system of farmland and carry out the equity of farmland according to the collective land ownership. And the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland as the main market subject take part in the process of land marketization and to ensure the land equity through stock dividends; meanwhile to separate the administrative and economical function of the local governments, to clarify the collective property of joint stock-cooperation system of farmland and to make sure the independence of the system; second, to perfect the mechanism of land marketization through joint stock-cooperation system of farmland so as to advance marketization of farmland circulation in the agriculture and improve the marketization of farmland conversion in the non-agriculture sector; finally this paper points out the detailed way of integrating the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland with the returns from land marketization and the specific type of peasants' participation in joint stock-cooperation system of farmland.Chapter VIII is this paper's empirical analysis. The cases in Shanghai and Taicang are used in the paper to analyze and examine the situation of peasants' sharing of land marketization through joint stock-cooperation system of farmland. In the relatively developed areas like Southern Jiangsu and Shanghai, the non-agriculture employment of labor is quite full since 1993. Given this, the increment of peasants' income comes from the property return of farmland and yields from expansion of agriculture development which is just the returns from land marketization. But in reality, it is not effective for peasants to share the returns from land marketization. There are several major reasons: the farmland circulation is so highly intervened by administration that the marketization of the land circulation is quite low; peasants' participation and sharing of the returns from marketization of the non-agricultural construction land is very low; cooperation is mainly launched by master-hands or superintendents for collective economy, which leads to confusion and ambiguity of the distinction between collective economy and the cooperation; there is still no mechanism for the returns sharing in the primary market of land expropriation; the level of peasants' autonomy and participation is low, especially in the independent participation in scale management and farmland conversion.The fifth part is Chapter IX, which gives out the main conclusions and policy suggestions. From the long term, the key for peasants to share the results of reform and opening-up is whether they can share the returns form land marketization. And wether peasants can gain the returns form land marketization depends on income increment from farm operating and property returns, while the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland can promote such mechanism to behave properly.