Study On The Marketing Channel Choice And Coordination Based On E-Commerce

The e-commerce has been both as a development platform and a means of survival and has brought new opportunities for the manufacturer in the global competition of network economy era. However, with the coexistence of the traditional retail channel and the online direct channel in a dual-channel supply chain, the manufacturer both as a supplier and a direct competitor to the retailer leading to channel conflict is a core focus of the supply chain management. Moreover, the marketing channel choice and the coordination mechanisms have a significant effect on the success of the supply chain management. Therefore, by adopting theories and methods of Game Theory,Operations Research,Marketing Science and Industrial Economics,this paper based on the channels harmony and the profit maximization, focuses on the intrinsic relationship between the strategic pricing and the a strategic compensation and the choice of marketing channels with addition an online channel to the traditional retail channel. At the same time this paper also has studied how to design contracts so as to achieve the coordination and realize the win-win situation both for the manufacturer and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain and to enhance the competitive advantage of the supply chain in the era of global economy of the network.Firstly, we develop a model in the dual-channel supply chain under the assumption of the retailer's price greater than the manufacturer's online price.We consider in order to mitigate the channel conflict the manufacturer, who acts as a Stackelberg leader, selects wholesale and direct price to acclimatize the retailer to the dual channel scenario gradually and to maximize his profit by the direct online channel and the retailer channel. And we identify the intrinsic relationship between the manufacturer's strategic pricing and the marketing channel choice in the dual-channel supply chain based on the pricing strategy in the single traditional channel. These pricing strategies are①keeping wholesale prices as they were before,②keeping retail prices as they were before,③selecting wholesale and retail prices that optimize profits for the manufacturer himself. Within these strategies, we also reveal some phenomena that the profits for the manufacturer as well as the supply chain always improve while the profits for retailer always decline under some conditions in the dual–channel supply chain. Secondly, the above mentioned pricing strategies in the dual-channel supply chain have not taken into consideration the service differences between the traditional channel and the direct Internet channel which result in intense price competition between them and erode the retailers' profit in turn. Therefore, we first take into comprehensive consideration that the manufacturer has invested in brand name and the retailer provide value-adding service for the customer in the traditional channel and then the manufacturer compensated the value-adding investment for the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain. Next, we analyze the intrinsic relationship between the manufacturer's strategic compensatiton choice based on Stackelberg game and three -stage game and the marketing channel choice in the dual-channel supply chain.And we also resolve phenomenon that the profits can be improved both for the manufacturer and the retailer under certain condition in the dual-channel supply chain.Thirdly, we develop a model that the retailer makes investment in innovation to reduce its logistic cost or its inventory operating cost and the manufacturer makes investment to compensate for the retailer investment in innovation based on the coexistence of the traditional retail and the direct online channel. It demonstrates that the strategic incentive subsidy investment in innovation can realize the profits Pareto improvement both for the retailer and the manufacturer. But the incentive subsidy investment in innovation alone cannot maximize the profits for the dual-channel supply chain under decentralized. Therefore, a price–markdown contract (or a price-markup contract) and a two-part tariffs contract have been designed for coordinating the dual-channel supply chain. It turns out that the price–markdown contract cannot coordinate the dual-channel supply chain while the two-part tariffs contract can do and achieve a win-win situation both for the manufacturer and the retailer.Finally, we set up a model that the retailer advertises locally to increase his own sales and the manufacturer makes investment to compensate the advertisement cost for the retailer based on the coexistence of the traditional retail channel and the Internet direct channel .By comparing and analyzing the optimal promotion investment, incentive compensation investment and pricing strategies between the integrated and decentralized in the dual-channel supply chain, we found that the profit in the dual-channel supply chain under the decentralized is less than the integrated. So we study the two-part tariff contract to coordinated the dual-channel supply chain and draw a conclusion that that the two-part tariff alone cannot achieve the dual-channel supply chain coordination while the suitable two-part tariff contract combined with a promotion-level subsidy contract can do and a"win- win"situation can be realized and then the manufacturer can provide infinite such combined contracts for coordination of dual- channel supply chain.