Allocation Of Airport Slot Resources

Along with demand increase of aviation passenger and cargo, airport capacity expansion is subject to more scarce land and stricter environment protection. These facts make airport slot resources be scarcer. How to allocate those resources is to be a topic issue in world aviation industry.This dissertation uses theory of rent dissipation and property rights economics, analyses allocation mechanism of airport slot resources. On the base of the analysis, the dissertation does demonstration reviews on allocation mechanism of airport slot resources on USA, EU and china. The main contents and conclusions are listed in follow texts:First, this dissertation reviews on related research on allocation mechanism of airport slot resources in world. Foreign researches focus on three issues: ownership rights of airport slot resources, efficiency of administrational allocation mechanism on airport slot resources, market methods of allocation mechanism on airport slot resources. China research is scare, and focus on introducing foreign allocation mechanism and apocalypse for china.Second, through synthesizing rent dissipation theory with property theory, the dissertation brings forward theory base of airport slot resources. the dissertation defines congestible regulatory resources which has nonexclusive rent and congestible and rival attributes. This kind of resources is faced with rent dissipation in process of supply and allocation and use. The governance of the resources not only includes privatization and nationalization, but also self-governance..Third, attribute of airport slot resources is analyzed. Airport slot resource is a kind of congestible regulatory resource. It is rival and nonexclusive rent and congestible. And airport slot resource is a kind of no storable service, heterogeneity in time, monopoly in demand and supply market.Fourth, price mechanism has shortcoming in allocating airport slot resources. There be three causes: be afraid of airport monopoly force, affect airline special invest on related facility, raise uncertainty of waiting time. So price of airport slot resources is regulated in the world. The gap between regulated price and supply desire price, if not being define property rights, will become non-excludable rent. When rule of first-come -and- first serviced is adopted in busy airports, the rule will bring up heavy delay, which wastes much non-excludable rent. So some other mechanism must be adopted to minimize rent dissipation.Fifth, to minimize rent dissipation, who should be in charge of resolve the problem? In other words, who should be main body in airport slot resources allocation? The main body may be airport, airline and government. If airport is main body, the airport may have little incentive to limit movement amount, because airport income is positive relative to movement amount. So airport should not be main body. For airlines, they may realize allocation by inner negotiation arrangement. And they implement arrangement by buying an exterior arbitrator or punishment in repeat games. At last, when airlines can not agree on this arrangement, government may act as an arbitrator or be main body. If considering fair and competition, government should intervene.Sixth, after allocation main body research, the next issue is how to allocate airport slot resources? No matter who is main body, resources allocation includes two processes: initial allocation and secondary allocation. initial allocation includes three main methods: Grandfather right, Auction, Lot. Every method has its merit and shortcoming. Grandfather right can promote stabilization of property right, protect special investment, lower direct allocation cost, but little direct allocation efficiency. Auction opposes to grandfather. Lot is quite fair, lowers direct allocation cost, but has no efficiency. So initial allocation methods choice depends on take off between efficiency and fair.Secondary allocation method includes two main kinds: secondary market and one-for-one swap. The benefit and cost of property right transfer decides which method will be choice. secondary market has promote airport slot resources flow to airline that has higher value on the slot resources, but if there be a oligopoly market in airline industry, secondary market may result in slot comer and monopoly action. One-for-one swap opposes to secondary market. So airline industry structure and market efficiency affect on secondary allocation methods. And the development of intermediatory organization is also affect on second market efficiency.Seventh, on base of above theory analyses, allocation mechanism of EU, USA and china are demonstration review. USA and EU give up price mechanism, but adopt amount limit, grandfather right, lost it and use it, slot pool. At the same time, they have different main body and methods. FAA is main body in USA, but government and slot committee is main body in EU. USA adopts secondary market, but EU adopts one-for-one swap. The former has more liquidity.Now china Allocation mechanism is similar with EU. China aviation industry locate in rapid increase period, demand of slot resources is rapidly rising. Apart from existed slot resource, there are much new supply capacity. So china allocation methods not only perfect present mechanism like EU, but also establish and regulate secondary market. There should be different governance between existed slot resources and new. The former should adopted EU present mechanism, but the latter may adopts market mechanism such as auction. In the process, government should assist to perfect slot resources property rights and regulate allocation process and secondary market.