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Research On Two-Echelon Supply Chain Inventory Decision Models For Seasonal Products

Posted on:2007-06-11Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:J H CaiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360242962322Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Nowadays, many products are perishable and sold over a single selling season. The classical newsvendor model perfectly reflects the above decision environment and has offered some basic research conclusions. This dissertation discusses two-echelon supply chain inventory decision models for seasonal products, which is one of the extensions of the classical newsvendor model. The uncertainty market environment characteristics are accurately described, and the main research contents of two-echelon supply chain inventory decision models are analyzed. An intact research frame has been set up.The basic inventory management modes are discussed. And different characteristics of different inventory management modes are described. Under retailer-managed inventory (RMI), the wholesale-price-only contract is discussed, and the supply chain members'optimal decisions are gained. After analysing a traditional buy back contract, we introduce a special buy back contract, in which an objective order quantity is considered, to further improve the performance of the whole supply chain. Our research shows that the supply chain can be coordinated and gain a Pareto improvement by using an appropriate buy back contract. The game between the supplier and the retailer are analyzed when the wholesale price are endogenous under RMI. The vendor-managed inventory (VMI) is described, and a basic VMI model of two-echelon supply chain is analyzed. And we further put forward a VMI model based on revenue-sharing contract, and the interaction between the supplier and the retailer is modeled as a Stackelberg game with complete information, where the retailer acts as a leader by setting the revenue share. We also analyze the revenue-sharing contract when the retailer pays the supplier a surplus subsidy for the products that are not sold, and we show that, by using this two-parameter contract, the retailer can achieve channel coordination and increase the profits of all parties involved. The dissertation also discusses the inventory decision model when there are multiple retailers, and the impact on the inventory decisions of the supply chain members brought by the inventory transshipment tactics is analyzed.We discuss the inventory decisions models when the demand is relevant to the retail price. And the model with one supplier and one retailer, the model with one supplier and two retailers, the model with one supplier and multiple retailers are analyzed respectively. The game between the supplier and the retailers are set up, and the equilibrium solutions are gained. As an important complementarity, twice ordering modes are introduced. First, we study the case in which the supplier gives the retailer a chance to order products in the selling season. And optimal decisions of the supplier and the retailer are discussed. And we study how to optimize the performance of the whole supply chain, and the Pareto set are gained. Second, we discuss the case in which the activities of ordering short life-cycle products usually take place after the demand uncertainty is resolved, when the supplier is not capacity constrained and the transportation time can be neglected. Based on analysing the competition in a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers, this dissertation discusses the influence on the competition form brought by advance order strategies. If the supplier gives the retailers a chance to order products before the selling season begins, the retailer who has abilities to accept the advance order chance will get Stackelberg leadership benefits if he accepts it. This dissertation only studies dynamic game models when only one buyer has the ability to accept the advance order chance, and we designate this retailer the natural leader. And we discuss two cases in this paper. First, we study the case in which the natural leader orders products only one time. Second, we analyse the case in which the natural leader orders products two times, which takes place before the selling season and in the selling season respectively. All the models are illustrated by the numerical examples.The results of this dissertation provide a brand-new framework and practical tools for the inventory decisions of two-echelon supply chain when the products are sold over a single season. The dissertation has theoretical significance and practical value to the supply chain management.
Keywords/Search Tags:Supply Chain, Stackelberg Game, Newsvendor Model, Contract
PDF Full Text Request
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