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On Trust From The View Of Game And Evolution Theories

Posted on:2008-07-06Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y Y LongFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360215455204Subject:Political economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
1.The significance and purpose of the subjectTrust is a very common phenomenon both in the economy and in the social life, naturally, there are extremely a lot of study results on this subject up to now. However, most studies on trust from earliest thinker like Confucius, Aristotle to the study in present ages are all from the point of ethics and morality. And the studies from economy and finance analyze the trust theory limits in the narrow sense of trust domain. Because of limitation of supposition premise of classical economics ad new-classical economics and their static or relatively static study methods, it is very difficult to take generalized trust into their research system and study it deeply.Along with the development of economics and new analysis tools, such as game theory, are used in the study, the basic theory study from the economics point becomes a new research area and Chinese economical scholars also must positively participate in this area. At the same time, our country has faced many trust flaws problem in the transforming periods, which has created the economic order confusion in the certain degree, and has hindered the socialist market economy healthy and stable development. It is very important to make the basic theory research on trust from the economic point, which can provide the economic basic theory support to resolve the problems of trust in the transforming periods of China. The practical significance of this subject does not need doubt. This also agrees with the request proposed from "the Central Committee of the CCP the construction which about Consummation Socialist market economy System Certain Questions Decisions" as "developing the society trust system bases on the morals as the support, the property rights for the foundation, and the law for the safeguard."2.The main contents of the paper This article studies he generalized trust, which means some economic subject (individual or organization) makes the pledge to oneself and contract fulfilled in interactions with other economic subjects. The interactions between economic subjects involve economic activities of transaction, earnings, debt and so on. The pledge in the economical interaction forms the certain contractual relationship, which may be in the form of implicit contract and explicit one. Here contract not only refers to ones in the legal sense, but also refers to ones in the economic sense. The contract essentially is one kind of agreement, namely each of the contracting parties achieve the agreement condition on some business responsibility and the right relations. From the economic points, contract is the result of people's strategy behavior in the economical interaction. From the economic points, trust shows that people in the games of interactions observes the contract ad make it smoothly fulfilled.As many factors affect the contract stability, so contract can only be relatively stable. The factors,which affect the contract stable, from the points of game theory, are including factors of inside game and outside game. The inside game factors are including property rights relationship, persons in the game, information, the frequencies and the ways of game and so on; The outside game factors refer to those which cannot be changed individually, like third party arbitration, technology advancement as well as exterior uncertainty and so on. It is these factors that make the contractual relationship evolving at the same time make the trust relations evolving.Trust coming and evolving from gaming needs some certain conditions. Property rights are one of essential prerequisite. Property rights essentially are contractual relations that give birth in long-term mutual games and limit the people's earning boundary. And other economical contracts nearly all base on property rights contract. Property rights are key factors to decide the benefit assignment. Trust is built on the basis of property rights, and good trust relations also have the function of maintenance and strengthened property rights. If people mutually are willing to observe the current rules of benefit assignment, then property rights decided these rules can be strengthened. Therefore, we may understand trust as respecting one's own rights, at the same time, respecting the others'similar rights. Therefore good trust relationship may maintain and strengthen property rights. After property rights relations established, the production of trust also needs other conditions. These conditions are including two aspects, one is the people in the game must have mutually effective restrains, the other is the third party effective restraints. The effective restrains of the people in the game includes the restrains of mutual reciprocal, also includes the restriction of penalty if one breaks a contract. In fact, Axelrod researches show that the reciprocal benefit relations can allow the trust creation, explained the reciprocal benefit relations are one of conditions for trust to create. At the same time, if the penalty mechanism can be constructed between players to penalty those who break the contract, such as the tip-for-tap strategy in game theory, trust also can be created by mutually restricts. The third party effective restraints include the voluntary restraint and forced retraint. The players choose to keep their words for their long-term benefits through the information spreading mechanisms. This is the way how the voluntary restraint works. The way how the third party forced restraint works is to punish those who break contracts by the violence methods and compensate those abide by contracts .In this way, those who want to break contracts can anticipate the consequence of their actions and choose to keep their words. Of course, we must realize there are other factors such as time dicount, game order and information and so on that make the effective restraint works. The creation of trust is a result of all these factors play roles and it is possible that there is a certain factor plays leading role at certain time. Trust will evolve after its creation and it evolves by the course of socialeconomy. This course of evolution is not only that of economical but also that of human knowledge and cultural. The technology advancement, which is an origin of trust, impelled human society's evolution, at the same time impelled the trust evolution. It is the technology advancement that increased people's active space and the contact scope and enriched people's material life, thus caused the demand multiplicity of people unceasingly to develop, which has caused trust unceasing evolution. Looked from the game point, if certain exterior restraint conditions maintain invariable in the long-term repetition process, then those conditions gradually becomes the stable exterior restraint. When this kind of restraint independently comes out and has certainly compulsory, it has become convention, custom or the form institution. The convention and custom, which are from people's economic activity, can generally manifest the fair principle well and it is possible to turn into the moral criterion. The form institution requests fairness objectively and it itself is the rule drew up by persons or the organizations which aced as social management. These persons or the organization correspondingly played the third party role. The rule can be implemented fairly also becomes the third party's responsibility.The economic activity has levels. Thereupon, each level of trust coexistence in the social economy life. Correspondingly, the trust governance mechanisms also present characteristics of level. The trust society is precisely operated under many kinds of governance mechanisms together, each kind of government mechanism has the function which mutually supports and supplements. They organically unify together to maintain entire trust system operation.The construction of modern trust society is reality request of our country at the transforming period to consummate our socialist market economy system. Conclusions of the creation and evolution of trust from the view of game and evolution theories have inspiration significance without doubt. The construction of modern trust society first needs to consider the property rights system arrangement as the foundation of trust. Namely how to make the property rights system be more advantageous for the creation of trust. Next is to consider how to strengthen the market behavior standard as well as the behavior punishment. Only to carry on the effective punishment, can trust system be built. It is much more important is how to spread the information publicly, fast and effectively, which can reduce the degree of information asymmetrical, and enable the public to supervise the government behavior well, urge the government to acts fairly as the third party role. All these things can enable the good trust order to maintain, cause the modern trust society soon to complete.In a whole, this paper may be divided into two parts. First part is fundamental research and the second part is empirical and applied research. The role of first part is constructing a standard theoretical analysis frame to analyze how trust created and evolved with the methods of game and evolution. The second part attempts to discuss trust issue, which exists in reality and analyzes the reason of trust flaw in our country in present stage. Based on the analysis, the paper proposes solution to construct the socialism trust system. This article emphasizes the fundamental research and also studies the corresponding countermeasure in the fundamental research frame. In a whole, the main content of this paper is the basic theory. I hold the science manner and methods and try my best to achieve the normal analysis and the empirical analysis unifies, and makes the intrinsic theory logic coordination. Based on this article research points, game and evolution analysis methods are used in the paper. In addition, this article also synthesizes modern methods such as case analysis and institution analysis according to study needs.4.This article devotes to following several innovations based on the achievement of the economic researches:Firstly, the paper discusses the fundamental theory of trust from game theory and evolution theory systematically, specially the problems of the creation and evolution of trust. Trust has been studied from the view of economics in the narrow sense for a long time, although the recent research already has developed regarding the generalized trust, the subject of fundamental theory of trust from the view of game and evolution theory is worth exploring systematically.Secondly, the paper discusses the relationship between the technology advancement and the trust. Some researches don't emphasize the technology advancement affect trust sufficiency, even neglects the affection of technology advancement factor to the creation and evolution of trust in the certain degree. This article attempts to study the influence of technology advancement on trust to make up the existing research insufficiency in a certain degree.Thirdly, the paper discusses the government trust regulations in transforming time based on the view of gaming and evolution. The former researches often emphasize how the government does can standard trust, but don't study the government trust as a standard taker (rule making and performer) from the view of basic theory. This article attempts to expound from the gaming point that, the government, as the rule making and the performer, must have good trust to become the fair third party.
Keywords/Search Tags:trust, contract, game theory, stable evolving strategy, property rights, institution
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