A Study On The Conduct Of Managing Agent Of State-Owned Enterprises Based On Performance Evaluation

It has already become a consensus that the capability of enterprise managers is very important. The resources of an enterprise can be divided into two parts as a whole, material capital and human resource capital, among which, managers' decision-making capability in enterprise operation and management, which belongs to human resource capital, is of crucial importance for an enterprise's existence and development.As economic globalization accelerates, SOEs are facing a severer market competition, and this competitive environment requires a high decision-making capability in enterprise operation and management of the SOE managers, which is much more important than any time before. But SOE managers' possession of good operation capability doesn't necessarily mean they would like or they can exert their operation and management ability. In the reform of state-owned economies, the old system is broken down, and new system isn't perfect, which cause new problems in the behaviors of SOE managers. SOE managers lack the incentive and restraint of improving their enterprises' performance both from inside and outside, as a result, there is no motivation or pressure to improve the enterprise's operation performance. From the short-term inclination of managers' behavior at the beginning of the reform, to the "insider's control" problem, opportunism, etc. in the present enterprises, especially in the past, an enterprise's performance is evaluated largely by financial indices, the performance evaluation can't truly reflect the performance of enterprise managers. This caused some managers failing to choose hard work, but opportunism, such as laziness, fake account, etc. to glorify their performance and obtain a high appraisal and lay the foundation for their promotion to a higher position.All kinds of facts indicate that to study the behaviors of SOE managers from the perspective of performance evaluation, and eventually find an appropriate way to regulate the behavior of SOE managers, have already become a very important subject.Based on the above thinking, this article adheres to the thought of putting forward problems---analyzing the problem---resolving the problem, looking for the answers to the problems with 9 chapters according to the specific behavioral features of SOE managers. Chapter 1 clearly defines the connotation and extension and study the significance of SOE managers' behaviors, further on, it comes forward the problems. Chapter 2 summarizes separately the research achievements of SOE managers' performance evaluation and their behaviors at home and abroad. Afterwards, it gives a sum-up of the study achievement of SOE managers' behaviors from the perspective of performance evaluation at home and abroad.Chapter 3 gives a general analysis of SOE managers' behaviors. Because of the specialty of SOEs, there are both consistence and discrepancies between SOE managers' personal goals and SOEs' social and value goals. Through the analysis of consistency and discrepancy, the general laws of SOE enterprises' behaviors were found (behavioral chain), especially, it divides SOE managers' behaviors into productive efforts and distributional efforts and analyzes them respectively. In addition, it sets up the game model, and finds the optimized choice under complete and incomplete information.Chapter 4 studies the constitution thinking of SOE managers' performance evaluation system, brings forward to introduce balanced scoring card to design performance index system in addition to the traditional SOE evaluation model of "virtue, ability, diligence, performance, probity". It designs an universal and China-featured SOE managers' balanced scoring card, which can make systematic evaluation and analysis adopting hierarchical analytical method, through the two evaluation ways of examination and assessment. As the purpose of this chapter is to study the thought of constituting the performance evaluation system, it is necessary to maintain the universality and representativeness of the performance evaluation system, therefore it provides a kind of theoretic structure and operating route.Chapter 5 gives a game model analysis of performance evaluation and managers' behavioral incentive and restraint, and sets up 3 game models, making game model analysis of the interacting relationship between performance evaluation and incentive and restraint mechanism of managers' behaviors from a variety of perspectives, and draws the relative conclusion using game models so as to guide the understanding of managers' behaviors, which provides a theoretic basis for performance evaluation practices and managers incentive and restraint. The first model analyzes the relationship of static manager performance evaluation and manager incentive and restraint. The second sets up the analysis model of SOE managers' behavior incentive and restraint based on enterprise linear performance model and linear incentive model. Through dynamic game model analysis of SOE managers and State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, it analyzes the relationship of managers' behavioral variable, performance sharing coefficient and shareholder supervision strength, providing a theoretic basis for efficiently restraining the negative behaviors of managers, and better combining performance evaluation and manager behavioral incentive and together.Chapter 6 and 7 give a deeper analysis and research of SOE managers' behavioral incentive and restraint from the perspective of performance evaluation. In chapter 6, it first analyzes the mechanism of managers' behavior incentive, and reviews SOE managers' behaviors from the perspective of performance evaluation. With regard to managers' characteristic and recessive incentive, it gives an analysis of the current status and problems, and puts forward corresponding resolving measures. Meanwhile, it gives a positive analysis of characteristic incentive in chapter 6. In chapter 7, it first analyzes the relationship of performance evaluation and SOE managers' restraint. Afterwards, it analyzes the mechanism of managers' behavioral restraint. And at last, it puts forwards the measures of improving the constitution of manager's restraining mechanism from the perspective of performance evaluation.Chapter 8 analyzes the current status and existing problems of the selection, appointment, elimination and receding of SOE managers. From the perspective of performance evaluation, it puts forward the measures of constituting the mechanism of selection and receding of managers on the premise of the improvement of manager market.