Excessive Competition, Tacit Collusion And Sharing Mechanism In Telecommunication Industry

This dissertation discusses on excessive-competition and tacit collusion which tend to happen in telecommunication industry, and try to identify some factors which is essenctial to operators' choices between competition and collusion.Here are 8 chapters in this dissertation. Chapter 1 is an introduction, which explains why we need to pay special attention on telecommunication regulation, and why we should attach great importance to the problem of excessive-competition and tacit collusion in this industry. Besides, tha author points out that there are three construtral comflicts in telecommunication industry.Differrent telecommunication reforms are comparied internationally in charpter 2. Regretfully, we haven't seen successful regulation forms. On the contrary, telecommunication reform has been immerses into an embarrassment around the world: the monopolization remains the same as before except that one telecom giant was replaced by several collusive monopoly in some countries, while excessive-competition and industrial loss prevailing in some other countries.Chapter 3 analyses excessive-competition in this industry. By using a symmetric balance game model, the author proves three essential factors which contribute to the unpleasant state: high expectation on monopoly profit, unbalanced .costs structure and price-focused competition. Influenced by these factors, simple deregulation will bring no society welfare but a war of attrition.Based on existing literature, chapter 4 concludes 15 factors which play important roles in deciding operators' tacit collusion, and suggests that product difference, unbalanced market share and cost asymmetry is the key factors trigger price competition between telecommunication operators.Because of insufficiency of existing explains on why oligopoly firms compete with each other, chapter 5 gives out Hotelling Model baesd on churn rate and time series. Telecommication services's "lock in" effect make the market equilibrium arrives long after price-adjustment. This character causes 3 price competition motives in the entrant or the incumbent. They are market-scratch motive, speculation motive and deterrence motive. Influenced by 3 motives, game between oligopoly firms may show 4 periods: after the 3 steps' competition, oligopoly firms will collude together at last.Chapter 6 gives out some evidences on competion and collusion in Chinese and world...