The Study On Mechanism Design Of Construction Design Contest

With the constant advancement of technology, the shorting of products life cycle, and aggravation of market competition, most enterprise living environment have taken villent changes, effective outsourcing and commercialization in time has being a key of enterprise surviving and development. Generally, the design and construction of civil engineering is not the key business of enterprise and most enterprise procure it from outside, the efficiency of outsourcing has a direct relation on the fast market reaction, cuting down the overall cost of the construction project, the improving of the quality of the whole project. It can be seen from theory and practice that advanced technology and efficient mechanism design have key impacts on outsouring efficiency. Therefore, studies of mechianism design optimum. bear much significance both theoretically and realistically.On the side of the owner, this dissertation makes a systematic analysis on some key problems on mechanism design of procurement of construction design in the light of game theory and mechanism design thory, combining with the speciality of construction design after thoroughly reviewing literatures on the procurement of construction design and its current research. The main contents are as follows:1. Based on the analysis of uncomplete contracts, it was uncovered that the core problem of procurement of construction design is the revenue maximizing under the incomplete procurement contract.2. Because the construction design procurement contracts are incomplete contract and there are not apparent substitutional measurement with which the owner incentive the design contractor,the agency mechanism and apparent objective estimation are unpractical in construction procurement. This dissertation put forward contest mechanism with game model and point out the profit of contest mechanism in construction design procurement.3.Based on mechanism design theory and revelation principle, adesign contest model with a owner and a few contestants is modeled and anasysed. The optiamal prize allocation and the applying condition of one prize and multi-prizes are put forward on the side of the owner.4. In the complete- information environment, the optimal selecting of contestants and the optimal contest mechanism is analysed on condition that the contest product is deterministic or stochastic separately.5. The influences of information structure of contestants on contest mechanism design are investigated. This paper compares the contest income under complete information and uncomplete information.