A Study On Residual Nature Of Labor Contract

The paper analyses the residual nature of enterprise labor contract. Being the core of enterprise contracts network, labor contract itself has duality corresponding with the duality of enterprise as production organization and contractual institution. The formation of labor contract results from the transaction between human capital and material capital, and its implement means the production process combined by main factors, as well as the value creation process, in which how to divide the residual claim and residual control is most important problem. The formation of enterprise governance structure aims at how to guarantee the process of residual creation and division.Chapter 1 serves as an introduction, discussing the studying backgrounds, the studying significance, the studying tendency, the studying technologic line, the studying frame, the studying methods and the studying characters of the topic in brief.Chapter 2 discusses critically several theory problems after look upon the development and achievement of modern enterprise contract theories. The paper points out that neither the enterprise theory reveal the essence difference between enterprise and market as two kinds of organization of allotting production resource, nor can explain the other important problems such as uncertainty or information etc. The concepts of transaction and contract as the hard core of enterprise theory have been misunderstood someway, since it only concerns on the surface not the essence relations of contract, and results in the lack of the thought about property rights or ownership of human capitalunder. All in all, the modern enterprise contract theory can not explain the hard core and essence property of enterprise contract.Chapter 3 discusses the property of enterprise and labor contract. The enterprise have duality of production and system, and the labor contract lies in the core of enterprise contracts network, then the paper analyses the duality of labor contract with emphasis on the character of labor contract and the function of factors in the production process and draws the conclusion that the formation of labor contract results from equal transaction between human capital and material capital which has the purpose to maxmize residual value by means of labor, the structure of property rights in beginning enhances this arrangement, but their positions also are dynamic.Chapter 4 discusses how to create the residual value in the implement process of labor contract, which is the basic function of labor contract in any social system,then the paper analyzes the either functions of production factors in labor contract particularly from the angle of the evolution and system, and draws the conclusion that all kinds of production factors participate in the wealth production, but labor is the only headspring of value.After exploring the process and headsprings of value creation, chapter 5 analysis residual claim as the economic realization of ownership. After reviewing the theories mode and histories of residual claim, the paper points out two aspect including the human capital privately owned by itself and its rising opposition, which both are helpful for human capital to share residual claim, and game theory is used here to proved the view. Then the paper studies how to calculate and account the value of human capital, and try to put forward a calculation model.Division of residual control rights is the topic of chapter 6. First the paper analyzes Incentive-restriction mechanisms in principal-agent, and points out that the resolution of Incentive-restriction must involve the share of residual control rights. Then the paper discusses how supervision works in teamwork, and emphasizes that there is the trend that the traditional supervision have gradually changed to incentive by share of residual control rights along with the division of manual labor and mental work combining with the facts of enterprise management and the organization structures' development.Chapte 7 studies governance structure of enterprise including the position ofboth parties in contract and the share of residual claim rights and residual control rights. The modern enterprise governance structure should change from the traditional unilateral to governance co-governance, the paper not only argues the necessity of co-governance, but also analyzes its possibility with the game theory, in the end puts forward the model of capital cooperating with labor and reform way under the socialism market economy.The dissertation has the following innovations: Labor contract has dual nature of system and prodution, it establishes and adjusts the original allotment of property rights between human capital and material capital,; the basic contents of enterprise labor contract lies in the creation and share of surplus value; Under the given condition of the social productivity, enterprise maximize surplus value by means of Implement of labor contract; the share of residual control rights and residual claim right both are adjusting continuously; the basic project of enterprise governance is how to creat and share the residual value between the parties.