The environmental pollution and resource shortage is getting worse with the development ofsocial and economic development. Remanufacturing is a circular economy model proposed on thebasis. Remanufacturing is a series of technical measures or engineering activities which take-bakethe EOL products and restores the value guided by the product life cycle theory. The standard ofremanufacturing is quality, efficiency, energy, materials and environmental protection, and themeans of it is advanced technology and industrial production.Since remanufacturing is a new thing,the awareness of consumers to remanufactured product is less clear, which led to the uncertaintydemand of remanufactured product. Then, the remanufactured product must be remarked the signsof remanufacturing on sales which makes the willingness to pay of new and remanufacturedproduct have some differences. Therefore, there has some theoretical and practical significance onresearch the operating mechanism of the remanufacturing system in uncertain demand and WTPdifferentiation.With the game theory, operations research and uncertainty optimization theory, this thesisresearches on the boundary conditions of the OEM remanufacturing decision-making, themanufacturer's selection of take-back model and the pricing of remanufacturing systems based onuncertain demand and WTP differentiation. The main contents are as follows:In chapter one we will introduces the significance and present situation of the operationmechanism of remanufacturing system. Then in chapter two we will introduces some basictheories about the operation mechanism of remanufacturing system so as to provide a theoreticalframe work for the following studies.In chapter three we will discusses the boundary conditions of the OEM remanufacturingdecision-making. The results show that OEM will obtain more profit in entering remanufacturingwhile boundary conditions are satisfied. It is because the remanufactured products' profitabilitycan be makes up the canalization effect of remanufactured products to new products. Meanwhile,this chapter analyses the dynamic evolution process of the remanufacturing entry decision ofmanufacturer with evolutionary game model. The results show that the evolutionary stablestrategy affected by the ratio of remanufactured products' added value to new products'. Moreover,the ratio exist boundary conditions which facilitate the system evolving to different equilibriumunder different values. Furthermore, appropriate government subsidy could promote the formationof the equilibrium of both remanufacturing.In chapter four we will researches on the selection of take-back model under three models:manufacturer take-back, retail take-back, third party take-back based on uncertain demand andWTP differentiation. Then the comparative analysis is implemented on the solution of the threerecovery models by numerical simulation. The results show that the manufacturer's profit ishighest in manufacturer take-back model and the new product and remanufactured products' retailprice is lowest in manufacturer take-back model. Therefore, the third-party take-back model is thebest from the perspective to maximize the profits of manufacturer, and the manufacturer take-backmodel is the best from the consumer point of view.In chapter five we will set forth the jointed pricing decision of remanufacturing system underuncertain demand from the perspective of solo manufacturer. Firstly, the two-item newsvendor model is built based on profit maximization. Then, the concavity of objective function is provedand the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimal conditions are given. Moreover, the solutions of the modeland the influence of remanufacturing products' WTP to pricing, productivity and profit areanalyzed numerically. The results show that the new products' pricing and two products'productivity will decrease while the new products' pricing and manufacturer's profit will increasewith the increasing of remanufacturing products' WTP.In chapter six we will mainly researches on coordination mechanism of remanufacturingclosed-loop supply chain. The results show that the retail prices of new and remanufacturedproducts are lower while the demand and the total profit of supply chain system are higher inmodel of centralized decision. Then, a benefit-sharing contract is designed to coordinate theremanufacturing closed-loop supply chain. The profit of remanufacturing closed-loop supplychain system is increased by WTP, and the retail prices of remanufactured products have increasedtoo. This shows that the elevation of WTP to remanufactured products is benefit to themanufacturers, retailers and supply chain system.In chapter seven we will researches on the extended producer responsibility sharingmechanism of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain. The extended producer responsibilitysharing mechanism is designed based on the wholesale price protocol of remanufactured products.In this sharing mechanism, the remanufactured products' wholesale price is the function of fixedinvestment of recovery system. In the pricing, manufacturer will transfer the extended producerresponsibility to retailer effectively. Then, the retailer will adjust the retail price of new andremanufactured products. So the extended producer responsibility will be transferred to thecustomer. Supply chain members and consumers share the extended responsibility each whichensures the implementation of extended producer responsibility effective.The innovations of this study are as follows:(1) The decision bounder of manufacturer enter the remanufacturing is determined. Then, thedynamic evolution path and decision-making road are introduced. Moreover, the boundaryconditions of different equilibrium and effective government subsidies mechanism are proposed.(2) The problem of take-back model selection, remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, thejointed pricing strategy of remanufacturing system and coordination mechanism are extended touncertain demand and WTP differences environments. Under such circumstances the theoryresearch will accorded with the realistic problem which has practical significance.(3) Based on uncertain demand and WTP Differentiation, the extended producerresponsibility sharing mechanism is designed based on the wholesale price protocol ofremanufactured products. Then, the conditions of manufacturers are willing to take on extendedproducer responsibility are dissucessed which provide a theoretical basis on implementation ofextended producer responsibility effective. |