Research On The Influence Of Capital Structure On The Agency Problem In M&A Of Chinese Listed Companies

As the most important means for optimizing allocation of corporate resources, Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can effectively promote the adjustment of China's industrial structure, comprehensively improve the innovative capacity and competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, and play an increasingly important role in China's socialist market economy. But the agency problem, which is the core problem troubling M&A performance improvement, is unresolved so far. How to distinguish the complicated agency problem in M&A and implement effective measures to solve the agency problem in a targeted manner has been the joint research for theory field and practice field. Therefore, research on the influence of capital structure on the agency problem in M&A of listed companies has important theoretical and practical significance.According to China's economic requirements and its specific market economy, and based on a comprehensive overview of domestic and foreign research results, this paper integrally used frontier theories such as Capital Structure Theory, Principal-Agent Theory and M&A Theory, adopted the combining methods of theoretical analysis and positive experience, followed the research line of "Literature Review - Background - Theoretical Models - An Empirical Study" and discussed the topic of " the influence of capital structure on the agency problem in M&A of listed companies"in both theory and experience method. The main work and innovation are as follows:Firstly, building the theoretical analysis model about the influence of capital structure on the agency problem in M&A of listed companies. This paper derived the basic assumptions from analyzing and summarizing corporate M&A and took it as the starting point of logical analysis. It first used"single agency"as the research object, established theoretical models, studied the effects of capital structure on self-interest behavior of managers and controlling shareholders separately, and then expanded the model to dual agency problems. It provided the new theory evidence for preventing managers and controlling shareholders'self-interest behavior from M&A on conflict of a"double agency"by studying the game between manager and controlling shareholder and the effects of capital structure on self-interest behavior of managers and controlling shareholder. Secondly, empirically testing agency problem of different Concentration Ration of listed companies under M&A. The empirical results show that, in the listed companies of dispersed shares, the agency problem is between managers and shareholders, in the listed companies of relatively dispersed or concentrated shares, the agency problem is focused on double agency problem between managers and shareholders, controlling shareholders and small shareholders, and in the listed companies with high concentration ownership, the main agency problem is between the controlling shareholders and small shareholders and such agency conflict increases with the deviation of the cash flow to control and is not conducive to M&A performance. Finally, empirically testing the influence of capital structure on the agency problem in M&A of listed companies. Through empirical study of Shanghai and Shenzhen market in 2006-2008, this paper found that the capital structure of listed companies significantly affected of the agency problems in M&A, reasonable capital structure can inhibit the agency problem, and the capital structure has a different impact on the agency problems in M&A of the listed companies with different agency problems and property rights.