Inventory-transportation Optimization And Revenue Distribution Research Of Distribution System Based On Different Decision-making Mode

Inventory and transportation costs are the core issues of supply chain management , which account for the majority of operation costs of supply chain. But for a long time, inventory and transportation have been studied separately, their integration has not drawn much attention. There is "Trade-off" phenomenon between inventory and transportation costs, which makes it difficult for decision-makers to make optimal decision for the whole supply chain, and leads to deviation between individual and overall optimization. Therefore, integrating the two most important issues of logistics system into one problem, and finding the optimum solution of joint problem rather than single problem, have not only great theoretical value, but also great practical significance. In this paper, we first study the static inventory-transportation integrated optimization(ITIO)of distribution system, then use evolutionary game theory to analyze dynamic ITIO of suppliers and retailers under bounded rationality, gain replicator dynamics for ITIO, solve the ESS, and then analyze the parameters'effects on replicator dynamics and evolutionary stability strategy. And use bargaining theory to analyse profit sharing of inventory-transportation integrated optimization.In order to cope with the situation that most of the literatures did not consider the impact of flexibility of transportation capacity and sale price discounts, we develop retailer-led model of decentralized optimization, supplier-led model of decentralized optimization and the model of inventory-transportation integrated optimization(ITIO) based on delivery capacity and discount sale price in chapter 3, analyze these modles and draw the conclusions. Finally, we get the relationship of optimal strategies and system performance among different models through comparation. Then we extend the study to an one-two distribution systems, we assume that both suppliers and retailers have inventory, establish ITIO model of two echelon inventory system, and compare the optimal decisions and system performance of decentralized optimization and ITIO model, and consider the integration between homogenous retailers.Chapter 4 study the dynamic evolution of ITIO based on asymmetric rationality. we develop degenerative earning matrixes under asymmetric rationality accordance to the characteristics of ITIO problem in many-many distribution system, gain replicator dynamic equations of the two sides and solve the ESS. And analyze the parameters'effects on replicator dynamics and evolutionary stability strategy, then use numerical example to verify the conclusions of the chapter and give recommendations for ITIO. The results show that the ESS of limited rationality retailers under incomplete information is the same as the selections of complete rationality retailers under perfect information. Through the analysis of the influence of inventory and transportation parameters we found that the bigger inventorial safety factor of individual optimization, distance between retailer and distribution center and start-up cost of vehicle are, the more likely retailers will eventually take ITIO strategy.In Chapter 5, we use the theory of sharing savings to study the cost savings and revenue allocation of ITIO. We assume that supplier and retailer share the benefit of cost savings according to a certain percentage. First, we solve the optimal strategies of manufacturer and retailer in decentralized optimization and optimal strategies of ITIO under traditional contract, and then establish shared savings model to analyze the optimal pricing of manufacturer,retailer and decision center. We also analyze the effort level of manufacturer and retailer, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium solution of manufacturer and retailer's effort level. At last, we compare the effort level, earnings and efficiency of ITIO and decentralized optimizationWe analyze the profit distribution of ITIO in chapter 6, which is a continuation of chapter 5. In chapter 5, we just assume that there is a ratio of profit distribution between supplier and retailer, but do not explain the formation mechanism of the ratio. In fact, profit distribution ratio is generally determined by negotiations bwteen supplier and retailer, bargaining theory can describe the process. We develop a bilateral bargaining model with retained income to analyze the income distribution of ITIO between supplier and retailer, and use backward induction to obtain the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the bargaining game. Analyzing the equilibrium, we draw some proposition. And we ue numerical example to verify the correctness of the conclusions.