Game Analysis For Principal Parts Of Interests Of State-Owned Forest Right Reform

With the development of market economy and deepen of state-owned forest tenure reform forests, the key for the success of the state-owned forest tenure reform is whether the rights and interests of the principal parts of interests of the state-owned forest can be ensured. Thus, the key factor for the state-owned forest rights reform is to abtain the equilibrium of interests of the principal parts of interests of the state-owned forest. At this stage, the reform of the responsibilities, rights and interests of the principal parts of interests of the state-owned forest face many constraints, of which the most critical factor is to build right system. Therefore, this study is based on the game theory, with a carrier of a scientific and reasonable right system, to abtain the equilibrium of responsibilities, rights and interests of the principal parts of the state-owned forest, which could provide effective guidance of development strategies for the state-owned forest right reform and to promote sustainable development of state-owned forests.In this paper, the principal parts of interests of the state-owned forest right reform are nation, forestry companies and forestry workers. First, this paper studied the interest situations of the principal parts of state-owned forest, during the history for the management of the state-owned forest. It was found that the reason for blocking the sustainable development and system reform of state-owned forest is the serious inconsistent of the responsibilities, rights and interests of the principal parts of the state-owned forest. The game models frame was built according to the game participants, game objects and its relationships, game hypothesis conditions, conditions corresponding to game strategy and system design.Second, game models were constructed for the three aspects of state, enterprise and workers based on right game equilibrium of right, interest and responsibility. And the results of the game equilibrium were analyzed. (1) Building the game model of state-own forest right reform. In this paper game models for the ownership of forests resources, management between government and enterprises (workers), right of disposal and interest. Method of double matrix game was used to study the game behaviors between the government and enterprises (workers) with regarding to the ownership of forests resources. The results show that the establishment of public and non-public co-existence mechanism is the optimal Nash equilibrium. Under the complete public ownership condition, the problem of "public terra tragedy" for the state-owned forest resources could occur. Excessive non-public ownership of the forests resources will result in the great loss of state-owned assets. To resolve the problem of the co-existence mechanism of public and non-public ownership, a relative reasonable form is to make the woods turnover. (2) Building the game model for interest of state-owned forest reform. Basded on the game releationship between government and forest enterprise, government and workers, and enterprise and workers, the game model of interest was built. According to the game model, the equilibrium for the interest was obtained. The mixed stratagy quilibrium of government, enterprise and workers depended on their income under the complete information and static game. Namely, the amounts of interests determine the probility for government, enterprise and workers to choice inputing or not. Under the complete information and dynamic game, when the expected income with inputing is higher than that without inputing, government, enterprise, workers will choice the statagies to input. On the contrary, the principal parts of state-owned forest could not choice the bad statagies to input. (3) Building the game model for responsibility of state-owned forest reform. The results indicated that it is very important to achieve reasonable income according to its responsibility, which is the optimal Nash equilibrium, determining to perform its responsibility sufficiently. If the principle parts can achieve the same income, when not performing its responsibility sufficiently, the principle parts will choice the optimal strategy of performing its responsibility insufficiently. In this condition, the economic development, resources development and zoology development will be blocked. We pointed out the responsibility of government, forest enterprise and workers based on the optimal Nash equilibrium.At last, the integrated game model was constructed according to the integer of right, interest and responsibility. According to the integrated game model, the system reform was designed and analyzed. The integrated game model was built with consideration of right, interest and responsibility of government, enterprise and workers, and with a carrier of system strategy. The game of system reform main includes two types of constraint system reform and induced system reform. The results indicated that the participant and government will achieve income due to the new system, when the participant is a non beneficiary and participant and government did not choice reforming under the condition of constraint system reform. This strategy is also the optimum equilibrium. Under the condition of constraint system reform, when the participant is beneficiary, the game can not get the Nash equilibrium. Under the condition of induced system reform, according to the induced system reform game model of YiChun forest right reform, some important results can be obtained:the incomes of government and forest enterprise/workers are zero, without loss, and they could get the interests from the new system, when they did not choice forest right reform; when both take reforming strategy, they will both get the interest from new system. When one participant of government or forest enterprise/workers takes reforming strategy, he will get the interest from new system. These results indicated that the Nash equilibrium is that the government and forest enterprise/workers both choice strategy for reform.In summary, the scientific and sustainable development of state-owned forest resources zoology and economy depends on the building of scientific forest system. The clear, reasonable, market-oriented right system is the core to promote the development of state-owned forests. The reasonable distribution of benefits is the key and is the driving force of forestry development. The responsibility is as a guide, at the same time, the fully implementing responsibilities are to protect the development of state-owned forests. To insure the success of the forest reform, we proposed the reform strategy of interest game, right game and responsibility game, which are the important forces to deep the reform of forest system.