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Divisible Goods Auctions And Free Allocation Of Total Permitted Pollution Discharge Capacity

Posted on:2012-08-20Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:C J RaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119330335454975Subject:Control Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:
Total permitted pollution discharge capacity (TPPDC) is a special scarce resource. The fairness and effectiveness of allocating TPPDC are the basis of pollutant gross control, pollution treatment and environmental sustainable development. A reasonable allocation method will help to stimulate the polluters to treat the pollution actively and to curb the self-serving behaviors of the environmental protection departments. Especially, the valuable theoretical reference and methodological guidance will be provided for making relevant environmental policies in the environmental planning. In China, the goverment usually uses the free allocation method to allocate TPPDC because of historical reasons and unbalanced regional development. However, every polluter's declared information in free allocation is his private information in essence, and is also asymmetric. So the facticity of the information can not be guaranteed. These factors will cause people to doubt on the effectiveness of environmental planning and pollution control based on the free allocation method. Therefore, how to measure and evaluate the validity degree of the free allocation scheme and how to propose new effective allocation suggestions are two problems which are worth to be studied.Free allocation and auction are two common methods of allocating TPPDC, where free allocation is an unpaid method which may not incentive polluter to declare the actual bidding information. Auction is a paying method with good stimulant. In practice, the objective of the free allocation method for allocating the TPPDC should be accordant with the auction method, that is to achieve efficient allocation of resources and to minimize the total cost of pollution treatment or to maximize the social welfare. Therefore, we can compare the actual result of free allocation with the predicted result of auction method based on the same declaration information, and then analyze and evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation scheme. To a certain extent, the evaluation result may reflect the stimulation of current information declaration system and the reasonableness of pollutant gross control scheme in China. TPPDC may be classed as continuous homogeneous divisible goods. Focusing on evaluating the validity degree of the free allocation scheme for TPPDC, this thesis studies uniform price auction mechanisms and models, and discusses the reasonableness of applying in validity assessment for the free allocation of TPPDC. The results will provide the government with theoretical basis and scientific methods to effectively implement the pollutant gross control system and design reasonable environmental policies, and improve the theory of auction mechanism design.Concretely, a typical free allocation model of allocating TPPDC is analyzed, and a uniform price auction model with fixed supply by using a set of conditions and mechanism assumptions is presented. However, by theoretical analysising and examples validating, the conclusion can be drawn that the bidders' collusion and low-price equilibrium will easily occur in this uniform price auction mechanism with fixed supply. So this auction model is not suited to analyze and evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC directly. Aiming at this mechanism and model's disadvantages, severl uniform price auction mechanisms and models are studied and improved based on the strategies of uncertain supply and optimized supply. The seller's expected supply and the bidders'dominant bidding strategies for these new mechanisms are discussed, and information incentive and effectiveness of allocation are analyzed. The problem of equilibrium excursion is also studied, and several suggestions on mechanism design to induce the auction to a desired ideal equilibrium state are given. The results show that these improved mechanisms have the properties of information stimulant and bidding consistency, etc., and can effectively restrain tacit collusion and reduce many underpricing equilibria. Thus, the allocation models based on these improved auction mechanisms are suited to apply in allocating TPPDC, and to analyze and evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation scheme of TPPDC.In application, several evaluation models to evaluate the validity for the free allocation of TPPDC are proposed based on the improved uniform price auctions of divisible goods. Moreover, this evaluation model is applied to the environmental planning of Han River basin, and the validity evaluation result of free allocation is obtained by analyzing the statistical data of Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) in 14 counties and cities of Hubei Province, China. Combining with the actual background, several improved strategies on free allocation method and current sewage application system are also given.The results of this thesis can be used to analyze and evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC directly, and improve the pollution discharge declaration system. This thesis also provides several good allocation mechanisms and methods based on auction theory for effectively implementing the total amount control of pollutants. Moreover, spectrum, power, treasuries and stock, etc are regarded as the continuous homogeneous divisible goods which are similar with TPPDC, so the results of our study can be used to develop some commercial activities by comining with online auction, double auctions and so on.
Keywords/Search Tags:Continuous homogeneous divisible goods, Uniform price auction, Total permitted pollution discharge capacity, Free allocation, Validity evaluation, Optimal mechanism, Uncertain supply
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