Recognition Through Dialogue

Everybody needs recognition from the society, people propose kinds of norms of recognition to the society, but which can be justified? This is the question the thesis is trying to answer. The interpersonal relationship of recognition is a foundamental moral relationship, which is the precondition of social justice. So, establishing the norms of recognition of a society is the starting point for constructing a good society.At present, there are two approaches to this question. One is substantive and the other proceduralist. The substantive approach tries to deduce the ideal norms of recognition from some kind of basic values through philosophical study. Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth, Arto Laitinen, Heikki Ik?heimo follow this approach. However, beside the specific difficulties of their justifications, they have the same difficulties of the substantivism. The substantive theories are monological because they are developed by the philosophers monologically, and are final because they are thought to be the idealist and definitive. However, people's needs for recognition intrinsically require social participation and dialogue, or the recognition can't be thought as true and given freely. And the people's needs for recognition change historically and vary with different societies, so the final theories not only ignore the changability and plurality of the identities and recognitive relationships, but also can essentialize them and restrain the needs for new ones. So, the substantive approach can't be successful. The proceduralist approach tries to develop some kind of procedures through philosophical study, and let the citizens to decide the specific norms of recognition for themselves through the procedures. At present, there are two typical theories in this approach, one is James Tully's pure proceduralist theory on the ground of the principle of civic freedom, the other is Nancy Fraser's non-pure proceduralist theory on the ground of the principle of participatory parity. Although their theories have no difficulties as the substantive theories do because they're neither monological nor final, they have their own difficulties. Tully's procedural principle guarantees the openness of the dialogue but can't guarantee the validity of the democratic decisions, and Fraser suggests a substantive principle to guarentee the validity of democratic decisions but it restrains the democratic dialogue too much.Based on the critical analysis of the theories, I suggest a specific proceduralist idea: a proceduralist idea on the ground of the principle of mutual recognition. According to this idea, mutual recognition is the foundamental principle of any good recognitive relationships. Because it's the social precondition of self-respect, which is the primary precondition for any good life. The principle of mutual recognition requires on the one hand that any reasonable norms of recognition should be mutual but not onesided, on the other hand that the norms of mutual recognition should be decided by the democratic procedures because the democratic dialogue is the necessary condition to form a community of mutual recognition. The legitimate norms of mutual recognition is not the definitive truth, but the social ideals in a specific society and time. The design of democratic procedures should take mutual recognition as its goal. The procedures include some basic elements as follows: political equality, deliberative dialogue, and the rule of majority. Besides, because the goal of democracy is mutual recognition, the democratic decisions must be tested by the principle of mutual recognition. The procedures are necessary but not sufficient conditions for mutual recognition because of the plurality and variability of the claims for recognition and the practical defects in the democratic process. It's a non-perfect procedure, which can't guarantee the perfect outcome of mutual recognition, but it ensures that the outcome will be most close to the goal of mutual recognition.The proceduralist idea on the ground of the principle of mutual recognition provides the theoretical foundation for the legitimate norms of recognition, and overcomes the difficulties of substantivism and the current proceduralist theories. Compared to the substantivism, it acknowledges the dialogical process in which the norms of recognition forms and the historicity of the norms. And compared to the current proceduralist theories, because the substantive principle of mutual recognition gets the democratic outcomes be tested, it promote the legitimacy of the ourcomes; and because the principle of mutual recognition is a thin substantive principle—formal principle of any community—it doesn't restrain the reasons people can apeal to in the dialogue, which guarantees the truthfulness and openness of the deliberation.The thesis concludes as follows: For those who are going to be governed by a norm of recognition, the norm is legitimate only when it is passed through the democratic procedures on the ground of the principle of mutual recognition in which they have all participated.