Synthesizing Governance Of Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Pollution And Food Quality Control In Producing

Striking a balance between quantity and quality, realizing economic, social and ecological benefits is the goal of China’s current agriculture transformation. After long-term extensive growth, China’s agricultural natural resources and ecological environment suffered great damage. Although output can be guaranteed, but the quality and ecological attributes are obviously unsatisfactory. So the keypoint of transformation is to bridge the gaps in quality and ecological attributes, "protect" and "governance" at the same time.However, Separate governance of agricultural environment pollution, quality of agricultural products seems unsatisfactory in the past. The key reason is that market doesn’t function well. But we think neglecting the interrelationship of two kinds of information asymmetry, namely the information asymmetry on environment between government and producers, the information asymmetry on food quality between producers and consumers, is the deeper reason. Therefore we think government should adjust governance ideas and synthesize the governance of these two problems.We define synthesizing governance as follows:integrating the quality standards and environmental standards in rules, integrating related departmental functions in management system, then relying on industrial organization platform to promote the integrated production including environmental label, eco-friendly input use and archival records in practice.Therefore, this study focus on the synthesizing governance of agricultural nonpoint-source pollution and source quality of agricultural, try to explore the theoretical feasibility, main constraints and the key points in promotion.Based on the asymmetric information theory, we prove that synthesizing governance of agricultural nonpoint source pollution and source quality of agricultural products is feasible in theory. Next we turn to explore how to promote synthesizing governance effectively:Firstly, based on the core question of synthesizing governance, we find several shortage of current agricultural nonpoint-source pollution management system and agricultural products quality management system in governance idea, laws and regulations, responsibility definition, governance means. Then we try to construct a management system directed to synthesizing governance.Since synthesizing governance needs to be implemented by farmers, so we take vegetables for example, select the production technology and management portfolio which meet the requirement of synthesizing governance and design a choice experiment to test farmers’ adoption willingness and behaviour of the technology and management portfolio. So we can get the technical constraint and factors constraint faced by famers. Becasuse farmers are short of knowledge and capacity,so we turn to explore the role of indutrial organizations.The results are as follows:(1) Common cause, common governance sector and player, coupled with complementarity in governance, proves that is feasible in theory. (2) Synthesizing governance should be conducted by public participation, and the main role of government in synthesizing governance is serve the market by providing environment information to producers and extending eco-friendly technique; (3) WTA measurement by CE (Choice Experiment) show that now perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use is very important to farmers’ willingness to accept; (4) LCM regression reveals that farmers’ preference is heterogeneous, sample farmers can be divided into four groups, namely "usefulness first groups", "stay unchanged groups", "environmentalist", "ease of use first groups"; (5) Analysis based on TAM shows that quality risk and aging affect farmers’ adoption;(6) Industrial organization plays an indispensable role in leading farmers to adopt synthesizing governance, but due to differences in the structure of governance their function is different (Firms best, family farms second, farmer cooperatives worst); (7) Further analysis based on collective action theory revealed,in the current situation where standard governance rules are still not established, governance cost of farmer cooperative will increase rapidly with the number growth of serving farmers, and ultimately push farmer cooperative’s products safety control into collective action plight.