Compensation Mechanism Of Soil And Water Conservation

Soil and water erosion is an important safety problem in China. It is a natural problem, and also a social problem. To accelerate the speed of soil and water conservation, improve the ecological environment, effectly protect and reasonably use the soil and water resources, are longer program which relate to the existence and development of Chinese. They are also important and exigent task which faced to China. After 2005, Central Party and State Department more and more regard the protection of ecological environment. It is written in the"11th five year programming of country economy and social development in People's Repablic of China"that China will perfect the ecological compensation policy, establish the ecological compensated mechanism as soon as and prevent erosion of water and soil. So, study and discuss soil and water conservation compensated mechanism has important practical meaning and deep history meaning.The paper analyzed the meanings of soil and water conservation compensation. Soil and water conservation compensation is that actions which result in decrease or losing of soil and water conservation's services and actions which consume soil and water conservation's ecological benefits compensate to actions which do the soil and water conservation work. Through the analysis of the theories of soil and water conservation's ecological services, the paper advised that soil and water conservation compensation should firstly think about the ecological services which could directly or indirectly realized through market such as water conservation and soil conservation. For the compensation of ecological services which could not be concluded in economic system and which independent exist out of economic system, they could not realized in resent condition of economic development. Through the analysis of soil and water conservation's ecological services theories and value evaluated approaches, the paper advised that the approaches which adapted to the offer was market value approach and opportunity cost approach, adapted to the benefit was market value approach and shadow project approach. The paper also analyzed that soil and water conservation's ecological productions had short, external and public characters. The approach to transfer the external character of soil and water conservation's ecological services to internal was to establish the soil and water conservation compensated mechanism. The paper constructed the soil and water conservation compensated frame system, which conclude compensated host, compensated object, compensated standard and compensated approach.The emphases of paper was illustrated the Panjiakou reservoir upriver area in Luan river, chose 2000 as representative year, simulated the water conservation and soil conservation of soil and water conservation measure. Based on the simulated result, paper counted the cost and benefit of soil and water conservation's ecological services. In the end, through game analysis, objective plan and benefit apportion coefficient count model, the paper studied out the soil and water conservation compensated standard of Panjiakou reservoir to upriver area. Main results as follows:(1) From AWAT model simulated results, the annual stream flow simulated results showed that the forests and grasses measure of soil and water conservation did not have water conservation function. Instead, the stream flow increased when forestland and pasture reclaimed. The monthly stream flow simulation results showed that the stream flow increased in flood season and decreased in other seasons when forestland and pasture reclaimed. It explained that forestland and pasture had water conservation and decrease flood peak functions. And whatever annual sediment simulated results or monthly simulated results both showed that the forests and grasses measure of soil and water conservation had soil conservation function. So, when we simulate water conservation of soil and water conservation measure need simulated by month, and soil conservation can be simulated whether by year or month. (2) Use game theory analysis, out of individual rational condition, the two players both chose the biggest benefit respectively. Panjiakou reservoir and upriver area respectively chose not compensate and not protect. So, the result is a Nash Solution. Any player would not break this balance. This was a representative"prisoner plight". Only when the government participated in the game, the government should harmonize the two players out of collectivity rational because it wished the environment can be improved. Thus, Panjiakou reservoir would choose compensation and upriver area would choose protection. Both Panjiakou reservoir and upriver area's benefit had been increased, and ecological environment had been improved. The total social welfare had been improved too. This was the Pareto Improvement.(3) The lowest compensation of Panjiakou reservoir to upriver area was the opportunity cost which upriver area paid out. The net benefit of Panjiakou reservoir after deducted the opportunity cost should shared by both reservoir and upriver area. By imported apportion coefficient of reservoir and upriver area, the net benefit of upriver area could be counted. The soil and water conservation compensation was the sum of the opportunity cost and net benefit of upriver area.(4) By used the benefit apportion coefficient count model, the paper received the compensated standard of Panjiakou reservoir: the compensation to ecological services of forest were 5.25 million yuan; the compensation to ecological services of pasture were 23.73 million yuan; the compensation to ecological services of forest and pasture were 25.03 million yuan; the compensation to the project of plantation transfer to forestland were 7.54 million yuan; the compensation to ecological services of forest and pasture in downriver area were 15.13 million yuan; the compensation to ecological services of forest and pasture in upriver area were 9.08 million yuan; the compensation to ecological services of forest and pasture in Kuancheng county were 0.94 million yuan; the compensation to ecological services of forest and pasture in Weichang county were 1.25 million yuan; the compensation to terrace project were 0.78 million yuan; for changing tillage way, Panjiakou reservoir did not need compensate because upriver area did not need pay cost.