Research Of Emissions Trading System Based On Computational Experiment

Computational experiment shows significance on the research of behaviors, emergency and the relation between micro-level and macro-lecel systems. As a typical complex system, emissions trading system is a suitable study subject to the method of computational experiments which to be a good solution for solving compliexity. Guided by the social science computational experiment method of system science, the dissertation utilizes multi-agent technique to construct an evolutive model of emissions trading system. Based on the evolutive framework, taking the eyes of the government, three key problems which the practices of emissions trading system in China are confronted with are researched. The major conclusions are as follows:(1) Aiming at clarifying the misunderstanding that the market function of emission trading system is unbounded, the efficiency of emission trading market is firstly investigated. According to economic basis of emissions trading, a heterogeneous agent-based computational experiment platform for regional emissions trading was established, by combining analyses of the diversities and decision-making mechanisms of companies in real. Then pilot analyses were done on efficiency of emission trading and permit price. The experimental results showed that:distinctness of the diversities of companies is the precondition of emission trading implementing effectively, it would advance system efficiency, or the operating performance of system would be even bad than traditional controlled instruments; transaction cost in system should be bewared. If transaction costs are large but cannot be avoided, increasing the diversities of companies could weaken the passive effects effectively; market price converged above equilibrium price, and a retarding effect was on permit price through itself; Price-oriented trading strategy could not lead to effective collocation of permits, but diversities of companies would generate a countervailing effect on system efficiency. The requirement of heterogeneous modeling and analysis on emissions trading system was proofed thought experimental results.(2) Effective supervision is the fundamental premise of emissions trading programs to exert advantages. The actuality of emissions trading programs in China haven't exerted its advantages, mainly is as the result of ancomfortable supervion caused by the shortage of supervison resources, capability and et cetera. In a two-stage dynamic game of regulator and polluting firms, the optimal supervision strategies to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively in emissions trading system is studied, including supervision level, the aggregate supply of permits and penalty shape. Based on gaming analysis, a heterogeneous agent-based experiment platform for regional emissions trading system was established using computational experiment. Then further analyses were done from perspectives of dynamic and bounded rational. The results show that, the optimal strategy to achieve target is to induce full compliance. This is not simply setting severe punishment, but seeking tradeoff between level of supervision and penalty. Finally, integrating the permit price directly into the penalty shape allows the policy objective to be achieved more cost-effective.(3) Mechanism design of the initial allowances allocation. Based on complexity science, the construction of emissions trading system in China was studied, focusing on the mechanism design of the initial allowances allocation. The conclusions proposed in this section can be summarized in three points:Exploring and constructing emission allowance allocation system mainly based on financial administrative allocation mechanism is suitable for China's national condition; but in a long term point of view, current allocation criterions for administrative allocation would generate significant perverse effects on firms'abatement, output or input, directly reducing the efficiency and operating performance of emission trading system; aiming at solving this problem, through an in-depth analysis and comparison of different alternatives, an initial allocation criterions integrating corporate social responsibility was proposed, which can ensure optimal institutional motivation, and allow bring other social externalities into the purview of emissions trading.