Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Participants In Group Intelligence Service Transaction

The Internet has become a vital application service platform on which large-scale user groups have gathered.Group intelligence service transaction is a new type of transaction model developed rapidly under the Internet model in recent years.It has received widespread attention from academic and industrial circles at home and abroad.Group intelligence service transaction is a distributed problem-solving mechanism openly facing the mass Internet.It relies on the cooperation of participants in different geographical locations to solve challenging tasks for individuals to complete alone.As a developing form of transaction,group intelligence service transaction usually has multiple attributes.Besides,the openness and dynamics of group intelligence service transactions increase the difficulty of service transaction research.Traditional service transaction model theory is not entirely applicable to the environment of group intelligence service transactions.At present,the research results on group intelligence service transaction mainly include group intelligence service transaction system theoretical foundation,group intelligence service transaction model and critical technology,group intelligence service transaction and supervision technology,group intelligence service transaction operation mechanism and performance optimization technology,and group intelligence Service transaction evaluation system,etc.The current academic research on the incentive mechanism of group intelligence service transactions mainly starts from two perspectives.One is the perspective of the service demander,and the other is the perspective of the service provider.From the service demander's perspective,existing research has explored the impact of task setting,task description,task process,competitive environment,and other factors on the quality of the solution obtained by the service demander.From the perspective of service providers,existing research on the design of incentive mechanism for group intelligence service transactions can be summarized into four aspects: winner determination method,optimal reward mechanism,number of service participants,and group intelligence service provider's motivation to participate.Discuss the issue.In terms of incentive methods,it summarizes the existing literature's effectiveness on entertainment game incentives,reputation mechanisms,social relationship incentives,and incentive mechanisms based on remuneration payments.However,the existing research perspective is relatively single,based purely on the service demander or the service provider's perspective,and does not consider the incentive compatibility of the supply and demand sides of the service transaction.Existing research mainly focuses on the quality of solutions obtained by the service demander in the competition mechanism and the payment of rewards by the service provider.There is a lack of incentive compatibility between the service demander and the service provider in the group intelligence service transaction.Secondly,the research methods of theoretical research and experimental simulation need to be further improved.The research on group intelligence service transaction incentive mechanism is mostly limited to theoretical derivation,and the research foundation is sometimes not in line with the assumptions of the reality.It is limited by the derivation elements and derivation difficulty of game theory,theoretical derivation,and real incentives.In reality,Elements will vary.There are few empirical studies to verify the validity of theoretical results through simulation.In view of the increasing application of group intelligence service transactions,the empirical analysis of the incentive mechanism's effectiveness has more practical value and can further verify the accuracy of existing theoretical research conclusions in real situations.The main work of this paper is as follows:First,it studies the composition and transaction process of group intelligence service transaction participants and proposes an Agent-based service transaction model.Specifically,the supply and demand parties will sign corresponding service contracts through multi-attribute negotiations to meet their own interests.By analyzing the formation mechanism of the group intelligence service transaction model,it reveals its internal connection and formation process.In the group intelligence service transaction,the service transaction process between the service demander and the service provider consists of five stages,namely,information,matching,negotiation,delivery,and subsequent processing stages.To better understand group intelligence service transactions,discover related knowledge,and provide theoretical support for the application and development of group intelligence service transactions.Second,combining the one-to-many characteristics of the group intelligence service transaction between the supplier and the demander,starting from the perspective of realizing the incentive compatibility between the supplier and the demander of the service transaction,based on the evolutionary game theory to study the incentive mechanism of the group intelligence service transaction participant game.Aiming at the problem of designing incentive mechanism for both supply and demand parties in group intelligence service transactions,based on the evolutionary game theory,an evolutionary game model based on different incentive elements for service suppliers and demanders is established to explore the relationship between the incentive mechanisms of service providers and service demanders.Analyze the influencing factors of the transaction target incentive mechanism,find the best incentive strategy for the service provider and the service demander to maximize the incentives for both parties to increase their respective transaction goals and achieve the incentive compatibility between the supply and demand sides of the service transaction.After the group intelligence service trading system adopts specific incentive measures,adjust the value of each incentive distribution coefficient so that the difference between the monetary incentive income and the total cost of the system to satisfy the service provider to provide high-quality solutions is more significant than that provided by the system.When the difference between the monetary incentive benefits and the total cost of low-quality solutions,and the difference between the total incentive benefits and total costs obtained by the service demander providing high remuneration is more significant than the difference between the total incentive benefits and total cost obtained by providing low remuneration,The trend of the service demander and the service provider in the system reaches the best state and the incentive compatibility state.Third,based on the credibility theory of information sources,it explains the effectiveness of service providers' incentives,which affects service providers' remuneration payments.To study the incentive factors of competitive crowdsourcing participants,the antecedent variables that influence the rewards of the contracting party are first analyzed to ensure retention and participation activity.Proposed and verified the non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship between the case display provided by the service provider and the probability of obtaining the reward;the non-linear U-shaped relationship between the service display and the probability of obtaining the reward;for integrity assurance,contact certification,and ability The positive influence of grade and professional status on the probability of obtaining rewards provides a new theoretical explanation for the persuasive effect.The positive evaluation of the third-party service demander is introduced as the supporting information source,and the positive adjustment effect of positive evaluation on the relationship between the credible factors of the information source and the probability of obtaining rewards is proposed and verified.The previous research failed to consider the interaction between the service provider as the primary source of information and the third-party service demander,the source of additional evidence.However,the service provider and the third-party service demander,as different information sources,may jointly affect the service demander's perception of the trustworthiness of the service provider.In order to fill up the research gaps,the interactive effects of the two information sources of the service provider and the third-party service demander were investigated,and it was found that the third-party information source strengthened the influence of the credibility of the service provider's information source on the probability of obtaining rewards,and expanded and enriched the Some research conclusions.Fourth,construct an explanatory model for the influence of the group intelligence service transaction object,the group intelligence service transaction subject,the bidding process,and the competitive environment on the quality of the solution.Taking a typical competitive crowdsourcing community as the research context,empirical analysis is used to verify and explore the demand side's incentive factors of group intelligence service transactions in reality.The task setting of the service demander,the task process,the competitive environment,the service provider's participation experience,and the bidding strategy will all affect the quality of the solution.Secondly,it is proposed and verified that the individual characteristics,effort level,and bidding strategy of the service provider directly affect its solutions.The competitive environment in the bidding process is also an essential factor affecting the quality of the service provider's solutions.Finally,the concept of participation experience and skill diversity is defined,and the adjustment effect of skill diversity and participation experience on solutions is proposed and verified.The inverted U-shaped relationship between successful participation experience and solution quality and the successful adjustment of skill diversity U-shaped relationship between experience and solution quality.This paper comprehensively analyzes the internal mechanism of group intelligence service transactions and the design of incentive mechanism for participants,proposes a more realistic transaction model and incentive strategy,and verifies the effectiveness of incentives for both supply and demand of service transactions through relevant empirical research.On the practical level,it provides a reference for service demanders and service providers on how to design task bonuses,task deadlines,and how to adjust their efforts according to changes in the task competition environment,thereby improving the quality of transaction completion.