The Research On The Mechanism Of Incentives And Intendance In The Public Sector Organization

Organization corruption, impractical image engineering, the sectionalism of ignorethe general situation, the behavior of disobey the natural regulation and breach theprinciple of science development, "central policy, local countermeasure" and etc.Above all these phenomena eroded the function and the ability of governmentseriously, induced government efficiency to fall, produced government crisis (thecrisis of the reputation of the government, the crisis of the public product supply, thecrisis of the government management and etc).The government crisis is the matter thattraditional government management system don't fit the intrinsic demand of themarket economy, the phenomena that the government management system limitsother reform are increasingly and clearly to appear, the reform of the governmentmanagement system becomes the center of our country reforms along with reformspush forward deeply. How resolve various problems on the government failureavailably and establish the mechanism of incentives and intendance is becomes one ofthe centers of the government management system reform.This thesis is exactly written under this kind of background, applied the theory oforganizational incentives, the game theory, the new institutional economics, theinformational economics, the contract economics, the organizational economics,broken-window theory, the theory of public option and etc, anatomized the internalspringhead and the dynamic mechanism that lead to government failure, thus forresolve the problem of government failure to spread thoroughly even road, putforward resolve measures originally according to different government failures, somemeasures are innovative. The research on the mechanism of incentives and intendancein the public section organization to be carry on thoroughly.The thesis consists of 10 chapters:Chapter 1, "introduction", this chapter introduces the background of the research,the article structure and the innovation.Chapter 2, "dissect the theory of incentives in the public sector organization", thischapter sums up and analyzes the application and progress of the organizational incentives in the public sector, shows us the essence and its important significance,through analysis of three sections, as follows, existent special problem in the publicsection organization incentives, academic analysis of the public sector organizationincentives and substantial studies in the public sector organization incentives.Chapter 3, "the principal-agent relationship in the public sector organization", theessential of the principal-agent relationship provides some incentives and intendancefor agent through some mechanism designed. This chapter distinguishes theprincipal-agent framework in the public sector organization and analyzes the way andthe characteristic that circulate public power, then analyzes the principal-agentproblem in the public sector organization, finally fetch out the government failureproblem, summarizes and analyzes the literature in the government failure field.Chapter 4, "the institutional analysis of corruption in the change of economy", thischapter uses the technique of math modeling, constructs a two-stage dynamic modelof game theory that consist of ruler, official and entrepreneur, analyzes the relation ofperfect information contract and corruption and the relation of incomplete informationcontract and corruption, consequently illuminates corruption is the outcome of somespecial contract and mechanism of incentives under bureaucrat system. Above allthese indicate a direction for us to eliminate corruption. Carry on institutional changeand perfect institutional construction.Chapter 5, "the economic analysis of corruption in the public sector organization",this chapter distinguishes the characteristic of public organization and carries onthorough analysis of the relation of the characteristic of organization and thecorruption of organization. As a kind of bureaucrat organization, the publicorganization provides feasibility condition for corruption, so we explore theorganization inducement substantiality and conclude that the problem of powerstructure is the basic problem in designing the mechanism of anti-corruption and thestrategy of anti-corruption, ameliorating the information structure of powercollocation and enhancing diaphaneity are also fundamental measures ofanti-corruption.Chapter 6, "the institutional analysis of invalid competition in local government",this chapter anatomizes the problem of invalid competition in local government,through analysis of four sections, as follows, the equilibrium of policy game, theoversight of property right system, the negative feedback of the public finance systemand the disfigurement of the achievement of government estimate system, illuminates the intemal springhead and the dynamic mechanism of invalid competition in localgovernment from different angles. Above all these conclude that need to constitutelocal government behavior norm from constructing the whole system environmentand provide powerful theories support for constructing the mechanism of systeminnovation.Chapter 7, "analysis of the policy performance game between the centralgovernment and local government", this chapter explores in-depth its benefit and itsmain realm of central and local game through analysis of four angles, as follows, theinstitutional change game, the resource allocation game, the economy growth speedgame and the finance and tax game, defines this outstanding phenomenon of "centralpolicy, local countermeasure" in the process of the policy performance, carries out theanalysis of game by combined the actual case. Above all these conclude that muststrengthen system construction and perfect game rules for eliminating the badinfluence of the policy performance game radically, make central government andlocal government in the process of the policy performance become valid equilibriumsolution, and put forward the measures of pertinence.Chapter 8, "the choice of approach to resolving 'tiao-kuai conflict'", this chapterexpatiates on various abuse of the government management system, further indicatesthat the sticking point of 'tiao-kuai relation' is 'isomorphic responsibility'governmental system, only after the 'isomorphic responsibility' governmental systembe broken, and carry on the responsibility design again, the organization design againand the process design again, besides put forward the measures and the principle in acreative way, consequently actualizes transformation from 'each government wants totake care of all affairs' to 'each government is responsible for a particular affair'.Chapter 9, "The broken windows theory and the anticorruption mechanism of'zerotolerance'", this chapter introduces the origin of the broken windows theory and thesuccessful practice of the 'zero tolerance' policy in neighborhood safety. Then, itanalyzes the common grounds between the broken windows and the corruption fromthe points of view of philosophy and psychology. Based on these, preventing andpunishing mechanism of 'zero tolerance' in anticorruption is proposed, which includeseducating and preventing mechanism that make the person don't think corruption,intendance and controlling mechanism that make the person dare not to corrupt,institution and restricting mechanism that make the person can't be corrupt, financeand supervising mechanism that suppress corruption in time. Chapter 10, "the theory of public option and the construction of the system ofincentives and intendance", this chapter elaborates the principal-agent theory of publicoption, namely the national legislature control theory, put forward the client can adoptfour kinds of measures to overcome agency problem, and then analyzes in-depth twoschool of thoughts in the public option theories——"Virginia school of thought" and"Chicago school of thought" to carry on a fruitful theories research in the aspect ofcorrecting the government failure, respectively from two differentangles——"Constitution economic theories" and "Re-create a market". We comparetwo schools of thoughts and two kinds of standpoints in order to have an aggressiveapocalypse for us to establish the system of incentives and intendance, and furthercarry on beneficial quest.Due to the limitation of the author, there is some shortage in the research need tobe improved.