| The report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed that the focus of economic development should be focus on the real economy.Recently years,entity enterprises are facing many challenges such as overcapacity and low return on investment.In addition,the return on investment of the financial industry is far higher than that of the real industry.In order to fetch excess returns,entity enterprises are gradually keen to allocate financial assets,which leads to the continuous rise of financial investment scale and the phenomenon of " transforming the economy from substantial to fictitious." How to reduce the excessive financialization of corporate and ensure the sustained and healthy development of the real economy is an urgent problem to be solved.The existing research mainly focuses on the motivation and economic consequences of financialization,and pays less attention to the executive equity incentives and corporate.Modern enterprises are facing the problem of separation of two rights,executives as the executors of corporate investment decisions,if executives pursue the maximization of personal interests,they may prefer the financial field with high return on investment,which will harm the long-term development of enterprises.As a medium and long-term incentive mechanism,equity incentive weakens the conflict of interest between shareholders and executives.Can equity incentive for executives affect corporate financialization ? What is the principle of influence ? As the basis of corporate governance structure,does equity structure affect the relationship between equity incentive and financialization of executives?This problem is of great significance for reducing the financialization trend of entity enterprises,optimizing the equity structure of enterprises and maintaining the stable and healthy development of market economy.Based on the theory of principal-agent,information asymmetry and equity incentive,this dissertation discusses the impact of equity incentive of executives in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies on the financialization of enterprises from the perspective of equity incentive.In addition,the impact of equity structure on the relationship between executive equity incentive and enterprise financialization is examined from the perspectives of equity concentration and state-owned shareholding under equity structure,and whether the effect of equity incentive is heterogeneous under the background of different financial asset motivation and executive finance is further analyzed.This dissertation uses the data of A-share Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies in China from 2010 to 2021 as a research sample to draw the following research conclusions.First,executive equity incentives can inhibit corporate financialization;Second,equity concentration and state-owned shareholding ratio have an impact on the relationship between the two,in other words,the inhibitory effect of executive equity incentives on enterprise financialization is more obvious in enterprises with low equity concentration and high state-owned shareholding.The above conclusion is still true after considering the issues of endogeneity and robustness.Further analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of executive equity incentive on enterprise financialization and the regulating effect of equity structure will be heterogeneous due to the different financial asset motivations and financial backgrounds of executives.That is,in the group of profit-seeking long-term financial assets and executives with financial background,the inhibitory effect of executive equity incentives on enterprise financialization is more obvious,and the adjustment effect of equity concentration and state-owned shareholding ratio has also changed.In addition,through analysis,it is found that executive equity incentive is to inhibit the financialization of enterprises by reducing corporate agency costs and investing in enterprise industries.The research conclusions have certain theoretical and practical reference significance for in-depth understanding of the relationship between executive equity incentives,equity structure and enterprise financialization,controlling excessive financialization of enterprises,and promoting the healthy development of the real economy. |
