Research On Online Combinatorial Auction Mechanism For The Transfer Of Urban Residential Land

With the widespread use of the “Tender,Auction and Listing” system in land,the process of land marketization in China has been accelerating,which leads to the rapid rise of land price and house price.The 14 th Five-Year Plan clearly proposes to continuously improve the urban housing market system and housing security system,and always adhere to the positioning of housing and not speculation.To this end,local governments have successively introduced the “two centralization” policy,which has promoted the continuous improvement of the urban residential land use rights transfer system and further implemented the supply-side reform of the real estate market.However,there are still some problems in the current urban residential land transfer market,such as high entry threshold and unreasonable allocation of land resources.Therefore,it is very important to establish and improve the land auction mechanism and avoid unreasonable land allocation.In order to improve the auction market of urban residential land in China,this thesis designs an online combinatorial auction mechanism by using auction theory.The research contents and innovations of this thesis are as follows:Firstly,this thesis models the urban residential transfer problem as an online combinatorial auction under the private value model,and defines a land correction coefficient.On the basis,an optimal online combinatorial auction mechanism is obtained,which can allow developers to fully express preference.Theoretical analysis shows that the mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality.In addition,compared with the off-line combinatorial auction mechanism,it is proved that the mechanism has a good performance in increasing government’s revenue,reducing land unsold rate and promoting the even distribution of land resources etc.Secondly,this thesis considers the influence of information interaction between developers,and models the urban residential transfer as an online combinatorial auction under the interdependent value model.The model is solved under constraint conditions,and an optimal online combinatorial auction mechanism is obtained.Theoretical analysis shows that the mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality,the applicability and operability of the mechanism is verified by a sample example.This mechanism meets the practical needs of the transfer of urban residential land use rights in China at present.