Research On The Relationship Among Executive Equity Incentive,analyst Attention And Real Earnings Management

China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "Measures for the Management of Equity Incentive of listed companies" in 2006,providing legal regulations for Chinese listed companies that want to develop equity incentive plans.The equity incentive system is becoming increasingly perfect.Some studies believe that equity incentive can coordinate the interests of both principal and agent,which is conducive to enhancing corporate value.However,there are also some studies against it,believing that the management may conduct earnings management to obtain incentive income,which is not conducive to the maximization of corporate value.Earnings management include accrual earnings management and real earnings management.The existing research believes that there is a trend of enterprises from accrual earnings management to real earnings management.Therefore,whether the equity incentive for senior executives increases the real earnings management behavior of enterprises needs to be further studied.In addition,the existing researches seldom discuss the influence of equity incentive model and validity period on the real earnings management level of enterprises from the perspective of the elements of equity incentive contract.In terms of how to maximize the effect of equity incentive and avoid the earnings management behavior of enterprises,many studies have discussed the moderating effects of internal control and media attention from both internal and external perspectives.However,as an important information intermediary in the capital market,what impact it has on the relationship between equity incentive and real earnings management needs to be further discussed.In this thesis,the relatively mature stage of equity incentive system development is taken as the research interval,and the Share Incentive Programme listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2021 are selected as samples to empirically study the impact of equity incentive programs on real earnings management behavior of enterprises.Specifically,this thesis discusses the impact of equity incentive on real earnings management from four aspects:whether to implement equity incentive,intensity of equity incentive,mode of equity incentive and validity period.Then,it introduces the external factor of analyst attention to further explore the impact of analyst attention on the relationship between equity incentive and real earnings management.The results of this thesis show that:(1)the implementation of equity incentive plan will increase the real earnings management behavior of listed companies;(2)Equity incentive intensity is positively correlated with real earnings management level;(3)From the perspective of grant mode,compared with stock option mode,restricted stock mode is more likely to increase the real earnings management behavior of enterprises;(4)From the perspective of granting time,compared with the equity incentive scheme with long term,the equity incentive scheme with short term is more likely to increase the real earnings management behavior of enterprises.(5)Analysts focus on the positive relationship between equity incentive intensity and real earnings management.On this basis,this thesis puts forward specific suggestions from the aspects of equity incentive scheme design,information disclosure system,policy and standard guidance,analyst industry development and so on,hoping to provide some references for reducing the real earnings management behavior of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen.