Research On Quantity Decisions Considering Government Subsidies In Vaccine Supply Chains

As the global epidemic situation continues to worsen and citizens’ health problems occur frequently,countries are paying more attention to preventing and responding to public security incidents in a timely manner.Vaccine is the most effective response method.Accurate and scale production is the problem that we must solve first nowadays.Due to the special nature of the vaccine product structure in the vaccine supply chain,it is difficult for enterprises to predict the market demand and make decisions in production and transportation.Therefore,subsidies are often used to encourage companies to develop and produce vaccine products.Based on the vaccine supply chain as the background,this thesis studies the complex characteristics of vaccine production process,considering that the government adopts different subsidy policies to explore its output and pricing decisions,which has very important practical significance.This thesis constructs a secondary vaccine supply chain system,which consists of a manufacturer and a retailer.Considering different government subsidy strategies,the thesis separately studied the production decision-making research of the vaccine supply chain and its impact on the income of supply chain members when retailers have fair concerns.The main research contents include:Firstly,this thesis uses Newsvendor model to characterize the demand uncertainty in vaccine supply chain and introduces three different probabilities to represent the uncertainty at the production and transportation ends of the supply chain to study the production and pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers.Late Rebate contract is one of the commonly used vaccine supply chain contract,thesis in this contract on the basis of introducing government subsidies,divided into no subsidy,subsidized manufacturer and subsidized retailer.Stackelberg game model is established with manufacturer as the leader and we obtain the optimal output and pricing decisions under various subsidy situations through calculations.It is concluded that subsidizing retailers can improve the profits of the whole supply chain,while subsidizing manufacturers has no such effect.At the same time,with the improvement of transportation reliability,prices and output are rising.The higher the manufacturer develops the vaccine,the lower its price and production.Finally,the impact of consumer loss ratio on price and output needs to be discussed in detail.Government subsidies can effectively reduce this impact,while subsidies to manufacturers can minimize the impact.Furthermore,this thesis considers that the vaccine retailers in the weak side of the game have fair concern behavior and also studies the production and pricing decisions of the vaccine supply chain under different government subsidy modes.Stackelberg game model of fairness and neutrality and fairness concern were constructed respectively to compare the pricing equilibrium results of all parties in the supply chain and the profit changes of both parties under the two scenarios.It was found that wholesale price,early production and order quantity varied with the increase of retailers’ equity concerns according to the relationship between early production costs and government subsidies.When the vaccine’s early production cost is large enough,the early production volume is directly proportional to the fairness concern coefficient and order quantity is inversely proportional to the fairness concern coefficient.