Research On The Influence Of Analysts’ Attention And Agency Costs On Internal Capital Market Efficiency

In order to solve the problem of failure of external capital market,internal capital market comes into being.However,the development of internal capital market is not so ideal.After years of operation of internal capital market,its disadvantages gradually appear,among which the main problems are principal-agent problem and cross-subsidy problem,which seriously damage the efficiency of internal capital market.When analyzing the factors influencing the efficiency of internal capital market,scholars focus on the internal level of enterprises,while the perspective of external governance is seldom paid attention by scholars.A large number of studies have shown that securities analysts are an important external governance mechanism,which can alleviate information asymmetry and agency problems.However,managers cater to analysts’ forecasts in recent years.Therefore,from the perspective of enterprise groups,it is particularly important to study the influence and path of analysts’ attention effect on the efficiency of internal capital market under the condition of dissimilation of analyst governance effect.This paper takes A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to2019 as the initial sample,and obtains the samples of enterprise groups by hand.Through empirical analysis,it verifies the influence of analysts’ attention on the efficiency of the internal capital market and its action path.The results show that analysts’ attention significantly improves the efficiency of internal capital market,and the influence of analysts’ attention on the efficiency of internal capital market supports the "information demand view".Secondly,at the enterprise group level,analysts’ attention significantly reduces the two types of agency costs,which provides empirical evidence of the impact of analysts’ attention on agency costs at the enterprise group level.Finally,the two types of agency costs play a partial intermediary role in the relationship between analysts’ attention and the efficiency of internal capital market,illustrating the potential path of analysts’ attention affecting the efficiency of internal capital market.In addition,further analysis shows that no matter what the nature of equity is,analysts’ attention is conducive to the improvement of the efficiency of internal capital market;When economic policy uncertainty is high,analysts’ attention on the improvement of the efficiency of internal capital market is more significant.This paper studies the influence of analysts’ attention on the efficiency of the internal capital market and the intermediary role of two kinds of agency costs.It not only provides a new perspective for the research on the factors affecting the efficiency of the internal capital market,but also enrich the theory of external governance,and puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for improving the efficiency of the internal capital market.