Study On Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Pledge、Tunneling And Enterprise Innovation Efficiency

Under the background of economic globalization and regional economic integration,innovation has become the focus of national development strategy,and the independent innovation capability of enterprises plays an important role in the process of national innovation and development.The development of innovative activities needs a large amount of financial support.Equity pledge is widely favored by controlling shareholders of enterprises due to its advantages such as quick fund transfer and no cumbersome approval process,and has become one of the main financing means in the market.However,while the equity pledge brings convenience,it also contains great risks,which will shift the decisionmaking direction of controlling shareholders,and then affect the innovation activities of enterprises.At the same time,the controlling shareholder equity pledge will lead to cash flow control and separate,exacerbate agency conflicts,easy cause tunneling,make the enterprise funds are a large number of transfer,squeezing out effect for the capital investment of listed companies,affect the normal business innovation activities to develop and implement,will ultimately affect the enterprise to promote the efficiency of innovation.Based on this,this article on the basis of combing the literature,from 2012 to 2020 ashare non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen two city as the research object,by adopting the method of multiple linear regression,explore the controlling shareholder equity pledge influence on enterprise innovation efficiency,at the same time,on the basis of the introduction of tunneling,study the controlling shareholder equity pledge influence the efficiency of the enterprise innovation path,the heterogeneity analysis is carried out from the angle of property right difference and industry difference.The results are as follows :(1)equity pledge by controlling shareholders has inhibitory effect on enterprise innovation efficiency,and the higher the proportion of equity pledge,the stronger the inhibitory effect;(2)Equity pledge by controlling shareholders can induce tunneling,and tunneling partially mediates the relationship between equity pledge by controlling shareholders and enterprise innovation efficiency;(3)Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the equity pledge of controlling shareholders in state-owned enterprises has a more significant inhibitory effect on enterprise innovation efficiency;(4)Industry differences will also have an impact on the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and enterprise innovation efficiency,compared with labor and capital intensive industries,the negative impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on enterprise innovation efficiency is more significant in technology intensive industries.Finally,based on the research conclusions of this paper,the following suggestions are put forward :(1)the regulatory departments should focus on improving the laws and regulations related to equity pledge behavior,and strengthen the supervision on the equity pledge of controlling shareholders;(2)Optimize the financing structure of the capital market,expand the financing channels of enterprises,and provide sufficient funds for the innovation activities of enterprises;(3)Strengthen the internal governance of listed companies and establish a perfect corporate governance system;(4)Improve the investment ability of investors and pay close attention to the development of listed companies;(5)Controlling shareholders should balance their own interests with the long-term development of the enterprise.