Research On The Timing And Influence Of Major Shareholders’ Divestment Under Performance Information Manipulation

In 2005,China carried out the reform of non-tradable shares.After the reform,Chinese capital market has come into the era of full circulation,and reducing holdings has become a new way for major Stockholders to occupy interests.The mode of market manipulation is changing from traditional mode to information mode.Although China Securities Regulatory Commission has issued regulations on reducing holdings in recent years,the number and frequency of reducing holdings are still in an increasing trend.There are a large number of reducing holdings and cashing out behaviors in the GEM market,which is called "cashing out board".By 2021,the total amount of shareholders’ reduction has exceeded 1098 billion yuan,and the number of times reached 6502.The research on the behavior of "precise reduction of holdings" in the capital market is conducive to the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors and the sound development of enterprises.In the part of theoretical analysis,starting from the signal transmission,information asymmetry and principal-agent theory,this paper summarizes the relevant literature on the reduction behavior of major shareholders.Based on the perspective of performance information manipulation,this paper sorts out the behavior of major shareholders in reducing their holdings,analyzes the means of performance information manipulation in the process of reducing their holdings from the perspective of the motivation of major shareholders in reducing their holdings and the opportunity of performance information manipulation,so as to draw the conclusion that major shareholders can achieve precise reduction under the manipulation of performance information,and analyzes its influence.In the case analysis part,this paper takes Company A as the research object,and after analyzing the motivation and opportunity of performance information manipulation of its major shareholders’ did-down behavior,it introduces in detail the means of performance information manipulation of major shareholders in the process of four did-down stages.The timing of performance information manipulation includes disclosure of positive performance information before did-down and negative performance information after did-down.The disclosure content of manipulating performance information includes manipulating dividend information and manipulating performance prediction by means of non-recurring profit and loss,asset impairment loss and period expenses.At the same time,this paper uses the event study method to test and analyze the timing and characteristics of major shareholders’ reduction under the manipulation of performance information.Subsequently,this paper analyzes the influence of major shareholders’ did-down behavior from the two aspects of minority shareholders’ rights and interests and the business performance of the enterprise,and finds that major shareholders’ did-down behavior will not only damage minority shareholders’ earnings and right to know,but also reduce the income quality and debt paying ability of the enterprise.Finally,in order to reduce the precise reduction behavior of major shareholders and protect the interests of small and medium investors,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from the improvement of laws and regulations,the optimization of the internal equity structure of the company and the protection of the interests of small and medium investors,so as to provide relevant references for Chinese market regulators and capital market investors and effectively protect the rights and interests of small and medium investors and other stakeholders.