An Empirical Study On The Impact Of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors' Holdings On The Hollowing Out Behavior Of Major Shareholder

Chinese listed companies have a complex shareholding structure and cross-shareholding,resulting in the phenomenon of emptying by major shareholders,and groups such as the "Anbang System","Tomorrow System" and "Huaxin System" are facing takeover or disposal due to The risk of exposure to takeover or disposal is time-consuming,high-impact and costly.The short-selling behavior of these companies has led to the cross-transmission of industry and financial risks,harming the interests of small and medium shareholders and threatening economic and social stability.Since the implementation of the QFII system in 2002,China has continuously lowered the entry threshold,expanded the investment scope and relaxed the investment limits for qualified foreign institutional investors.With the relaxation of the policy,more and more QFIIs hold stocks of Chinese listed companies.Can QFIIs suppress the existence of large shar eholders’ short-selling behaviors in Chinese listed companies through their professional corporate governance capabilities and safeguard the interests of small and medium-sized investors.This paper explores the relationship between QFII shareholding and large shareholder short-selling from this issue.Based on the research results related to the emptying of major shareholders and QFII,this paper analyzes the impact of QFII on the emptying of major shareholders,the impact of QFII on enterprises with different property rights and the impact of different institutional investors on the emptying of major shareholders using a panel fixed effects model with the data of Chinese A-share listed companies in the decade of 2012-2021 as a sample.The empirical results show that the phenomenon of large shareholder shelling does exist in listed companies in China,and the shareholding of QFIIs can inhibit the shelling behavior of large shareholders in listed companies,and the two are negatively correlated,and as the proportion of QFIIs’ shareholding increases,it can form a stronger restraining rela tionship with large shareholders and thus avoid the shelling behavior;the phenomenon of large shareholder shelling exists more commonly in state-owned enterprises,and QFIIs’ shareholding has a stronger inhibitory effect on state-owned enterprises.The study also finds that QFIIs have a more pronounced inhibitory effect on major shareholder short-selling than local institutional investors.The empirical results still hold after considering the endogeneity issue.By replacing the explanatory variables and changing the sample size for the ro bustness test,the empirical results are basically consistent with the previous paper.Finally,this paper puts forward suggestions in three aspects,namely,promoting QFIIs to increase their holdings of China’s listed companies,building an enterprise information matching service platform,and improving laws and regulations.