Research On Rural Financial Institutions’ Behavior Of “De-Agriculture” And Its Correction Strategies

The report of the Party’s 20 th National Congress stressed that "to comprehensively promote rural revitalization and comprehensively build a modern socialist country,the most arduous and onerous task still lies in the rural areas,and the priority development of agriculture and rural areas should be adhered to".As the main force of rural financial service supply,rural financial institutions play a pivotal role in rural economic development and rural revitalization.However,with the continuous strengthening of commercialization,rural financial institutions gradually appear the behavior of "deagriculture" due to excessive interest,which has an extremely adverse influence on the development of " agriculture,rural areas and rural people" and the promotion of rural revitalization.Therefore,from the perspective of evolutionary game analysis,this thesis makes comprehensive use of financial exclusion theory,information asymmetry theory and transaction cost theory to deeply explore the rural financial institutions’ " de-agriculture " behavior and its correction strategies,so as to provide directional guidance for realizing the balance between rural financial supply and demand and promoting the development of "agriculture,rural areas and rural people".The main problems to be solved in this study include: firstly,what are the specific manifestations of rural financial institutions’ " deagriculture" behavior? Secondly,what are the reasons of rural financial institutions’ " deagriculture" behavior? Thirdly,how to correct the behavior of rural financial institutions "de-agriculture " ?Based on the open data,this study analyzes the main performances of the rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior.Secondly,theoretically analyzes the causes of the rural financial institutions’ behavior of "de-agriculture".Furthermore,further analyzes the evolution game of rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior,and considers the influence of local government’s behavior on rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior.Finally,numerical simulation is used to analyze the correction strategies of rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior,and on this basis,the policy suggestions are put forward for the correction of rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior.The results show that: firstly,the phenomenon of rural financial institutions "deagriculture" is mainly reflected in the weak supply of rural financial services and the serious outflow of rural financial resources,and the interaction between rural financial institutions and their influencing subjects,namely agricultural management subjects and local governments,is an important reason affecting their "de-agriculture".Secondly,whether rural financial institutions and their influencing subjects cooperate or not in the dynamic game process depends on the probability of their willingness to cooperate with each influencing subjects.In the absence of local government participation,the evolutionary equilibrium between rural financial institutions and agricultural operating subjects is that both parties do not cooperate,and the rural financial market mechanism is in a dysfunctional state.Thirdly,considering the evolutionary game analysis of rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior with the participation of local governments,it is found that the participation of local governments does promote the correction of rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior.Fourthly,by using Matlab2016 b to conduct numerical simulation of six scenarios,and it is found that the system can be convergent to the ideal state by adjusting relevant parameters,indicating that the positive interaction between rural financial institutions and their influencing subjects can correct the "de-agriculture" behavior of rural financial institutions.In addition,in the analysis of the influence of changing key parameters on the evolutionary stability of rural financial institutions,The change of the initial group proportion of adopting a certain strategy,rural financial institution’s income from supporting agriculture,the cost of supporting agriculture,the comprehensive loss when supporting agriculture in defaults,the share of bad loans in default,the decline of social reputation and other losses,the strength of punishment given by local governments for leaving agriculture and the strength of reward given by local governments for supporting agriculture have more significant effects on the behavior choice strategy of rural financial institutions.Therefore,the state should give policy support to facilitate the correction of rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior and improve the enthusiasm of supporting agriculture,so as to realize rural revitalization.One of the reasons for rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior is the high cost of supporting agriculture.To reduce the cost of supporting agriculture,we can construct an integrated industrial chain mode of financing by rural financial institutions,participation of agricultural business entities and support of local governments through innovative service means and operation mode,and reduce information asymmetry through the construction of big data platform.The default risk of agricultural business subjects can be reduced by speeding up the establishment and improvement of rural credit system;furthermore,the government’s responsibility can be strengthened to correct the rural financial institutions’ "de-agriculture" behavior.