An Empirical Analysis Of Directors’ Performance,Remuneration And Corporate Performance Of Chinese Listed Companies

In listed companies,directors(including independent directors and nonindependent directors,etc.)assume the responsibility of making strategic decisions and supervising the management,and obtain a certain remuneration from the company.However,in the governance of listed companies in my country,there is a very common phenomenon,that is,people often emphasize the responsibility of making strategic decisions and supervising the management of independent directors,while ignoring the responsibility of the directors as a whole.This has caused various problems,such as the inability of the board of directors to effectively grasp the direction of the company’s development,the inability of the management to perform their duties strictly according to the requirements of shareholders,and the prominent problems of insider control.Under this circumstance,it is necessary to systematically study the relationship between directors’ performance and their remuneration of Chinese listed companies,and the impact of directors’ performance and remuneration on company performance.The main content of this article is as follows: The first chapter is the introduction.First,the topic selection background and research significance of the article are introduced,and then the relevant domestic and foreign documents are summarized and summarized.Finally,the research content and research methods of this article are explained,and the research innovations are further elaborated.The second chapter is related concepts and basic theories.This chapter introduces the basic concepts related to this article and the theoretical basis of the research.The third chapter analyzes the performance of directors of listed companies in China and their remuneration status in detail.Chapter 4 introduces the mechanism of directors’ performance and remuneration affecting company performance.The fifth chapter is about the empirical design of directors’ performance and remuneration in Chinese listed companies affecting company performance.It is mainly explained from the research hypothesis,variable design,model construction,sample selection and data source.The sixth chapter empirically analyzes the relationship between directors’ performance,remuneration and company performance,and relationship between directors’ performance and remuneration of Chinese listed companies through regression models.The seventh chapter is the research conclusions,relevant suggestions and research prospects of this article.Based on the data of Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2019,this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between director performance,remuneration and company performance in Chinese listed companies.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)Directors’ meeting attendance is positively correlated with company performance,that is,the higher the director’s meeting attendance,the better the company’s performance.(2)There is no obvious correlation between directors’ negative opinions and company performance.(3)Directors’ remuneration is significantly positively correlated with company performance,higher directors’ remuneration helps mobilize directors’ enthusiasm for work,prompt them to perform their supervisory functions more actively,thereby improve company performance.(4)The higher the attendance of directors at meetings,the higher the remuneration of directors;the higher the director’s remuneration when the directors put forward negative opinions on board meeting proposals.(5)The higher the director’s remuneration,the higher the meeting attendance;the higher the director’s remuneration,the more the director likely to put forward negative opinions on the board meeting proposals.Based on the above analysis,several countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to improve the governance of directors’ : clarify the responsibilities of directors;improve the evaluation and assessment mechanism of directors;ensure the frequency and quality of directors’ participation in board meetings;formulate reasonable directors’ remuneration standards;strengthen the linkage between directors’ performance and director’s remuneration;improve the management system of listed companies.