An Empirical Analysis Of Power Allocation In Parent-subsidiary Corporations And Investment Efficiency

Parent-subsidiary enterprise groups have become a common and important organizational form in China,but they are always facing the dilemma of decentralized management.How to improve the economic benefits of enterprise groups has become a common concern of all parties.Power allocation is the core issue of group management and control,and investment activities are one of the most important financial activities of enterprises.Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the relationship between power allocation and investment efficiency between parent and subsidiary companies.By absorbing all kinds of theoretical resources,this paper summarizes the core mechanism and path of power allocation.Then,from the perspective of financial rights and personnel rights,an empirical study is conducted on the relationship between the allocation of power and the overall investment efficiency of listed companies and their subsidiaries by taking a-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2019 as samples.The results show that :(1)in the current stage,the concentration of financial power improves the investment efficiency of parent-subsidiary companies,and this effect is more obvious in the sample of over-investment,while the tunneling of controlling shareholders plays a partial intermediary role.(2)There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between personnel power concentration and investment efficiency.(3)The concentration of financial rights smooth the inverted U-shaped relationship between the concentration of personnel rights and investment efficiency.(4)The concentration of personnel power amplifies the promotion effect of the concentration level of financial power on investment efficiency,but this effect is not clear at the low concentration level of personnel power.(5)The improvement of environmental uncertainty amplifies the promotion effect of financial rights concentration on investment efficiency,and makes the inflection point of the inverted U-shaped curve between personnel rights concentration and investment efficiency shift to the right.On this basis,this paper provides four main suggestions for the dilemma of group management and control in China.First,the parent company strictly controls financial rights to achieve unified management of funds and improve the group’s financial information control system.Second,the parent company should take appropriate centralized control of personnel rights,and standardize and improve the corresponding personnel management rules and regulations.Third,the interaction between different group management and control means should be fully considered to play a systematic role.Fourth,all kinds of contingency factors should be considered when formulating control plans.