Research On The Impact Of Multiple Major Shareholders On Corporate Innovation Investment

Science and technology are the primary productive forces,and technological innovation is very important.It can effectively promote national progress and enterprise development,and is the fundamental means for the sustainable growth of national economy and the formation of long-term competitive advantages of enterprises.With the support of the innovation-driven development strategy of the Party and the state,more and more enterprises attach importance to innovation investment.Therefore,it is a hot topic for Chinese theoretical and practical circles to promote enterprises to take on heavy responsibility of innovation,increase the level of innovation investment and realize high-quality innovation.Along with the development of the reform of nontradable shares and the reform of mixed ownership,the shareholding proportion of the largest shareholder in the enterprise declines gradually,and the ownership structure of many major shareholders is widely existed in the market.When studying multiple major shareholders,most of the existing studies at home and abroad start from the dummy variable of whether there are multiple major shareholders to explore the impact of such ownership structure on enterprise innovation investment.For those enterprises with multiple major shareholders,the major shareholders are further subdivided into the first major shareholder,relative controlling shareholder and non-controlling major shareholder.The influence of creditor’s rights,as another major source of capital,on the relationship between major shareholders and innovation investment is still unclear.Exploring the above relationship is of great significance for the governance and development of enterprises,especially the long-term development.Based on the relevant literature and the principal-agent theory,the corporate governance theory,the information asymmetry theory and the discretionary governance theory of liabilities,this thesis analyzes the relationship between the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,the relative number of controlling shareholders and the number of non-controlling major shareholders,debt constraints and enterprise innovation investment,and puts forward the corresponding hypothesis.Based on this,this thesis takes the listed enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen with multiple major shareholders from 2010 to 2021 as samples,tests the relationship among the enterprises with multiple major shareholders,the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,the number of relative controlling shareholders and the number of non-controlling major shareholders,and the enterprise innovation investment,and tests the moderating effect of debt constraints.This thesis studies the effect path of major shareholders on innovation investment,and further discusses the differences of the above relationships under different property rights.The results show that:(1)In enterprises with multiple major shareholders,the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,the number of relative controlling shareholders and the enterprise innovation investment are significantly negatively correlated,while the number of non-controlling major shareholders is significantly positively correlated with the enterprise innovation investment.(2)In enterprises with multiple major shareholders,debt constraint plays a moderating role between major shareholders and enterprise innovation investment.Specifically,debt constraint weakens the negative relationship between the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,the relative holding number and enterprise innovation investment,and weakens the positive relationship between the number of non-controlling major shareholders and enterprise innovation investment.(3)Risk taking plays a partial mediating role in the influence of major shareholders on innovation investment.(4)In the non-state-owned enterprise group,the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,the number of relative controlling shareholders and enterprise innovation investment have a significant negative correlation,the number of non-controlling major shareholders and enterprise innovation investment has a significant positive correlation,debt constraints have a significant moderating effect between major shareholders and enterprise innovation investment,and risk taking has a significant mediating effect between major shareholders and enterprise innovation investment.In the group of stateowned enterprises,the above relationships are not significant.Based on the above research conclusions,in order to improve the level of enterprise innovation investment,the thesis proposes that enterprises should pay attention to optimizing the ownership structure,actively play the external governance mechanism of creditor’s rights,and the government should promote the in-depth reform of enterprises and other policy suggestions.