Social Security Fund Shareholding And Enterprise Financialization

As an important part of enterprise investment decision,financial asset allocation can not only reflect the performance of professional managers’ responsibilities,but also be regarded as a micro reflection of the current order of the capital market to a certain extent.Compared with developed countries,on the one hand,China’s current institutional management of the financing market is still lacking,and it is not uncommon for small and medium-sized enterprises to have difficulties in financing from formal channels.Some enterprises have to choose to hoard financial assets with strong liquidity for future operation needs,while enterprises with asset scale or property ownership advantages can obtain required funds from banks at ultra-low interest rates.The appearance of loan discrimination provides feasible conditions for enterprises to cash in excess investment income.On the other hand,our country’s institutional protection for enterprise stakeholders is not perfect.In the face of the conflict between personal interests and corporate value goals,the management may ignore the public interests and urge the enterprise to maximize short-term profits by allocating financial assets.In view of the limitations of China’s current development stage,it may be difficult to rely solely on laws and regulations to timely regulate enterprise investment behavior in a short period of time,so finding effective external institutional factors is of great benefit to make up for the defects of enterprise governance.As an important part of improving the multi-level social security system,deepening the reform of the capital market and promoting the sustainable,healthy and stable development of the market,the social security fund’s complementary role in corporate governance has a position that cannot be ignored.Therefore,this thesis starts from the external system of social security fund shareholding,and discusses whether it can inhibit the financialization of enterprises,in order to provide some evidence support and reference for the academic and practical circles.Taking A-share non-financial listed enterprises from 2010 to 2020 as samples,this thesis examines the influence,internal mechanism and further economic consequences of the shareholding of social security fund on the level of financialization of enterprises.The results show that:(1)the shareholding of social security fund significantly inhibits the financialization level of enterprises,and this conclusion is still valid after a series of robust tests such as instrumental variable method,Heckman two-stage regression method and propensity score matching method.(2)In the test of the mechanism of action,it is found that the shareholding of the Social Security fund mainly reduces the financialization investment of the prevention of savings motivation by easing the financing constraints of enterprises,and restrains the financialization investment of the investment substitution motivation by reducing the yield gap between financial and real investment and improving the agency problem of enterprises.(3)When the shareholding of the Social security fund has strong stability,the investment mode is entrusted shareholding,the banking competition in the place where the enterprise is located is small,the relationship between banks and enterprises is good,and the concentration of equity is low,the shareholding of the social security fund has a more significant inhibitory effect on the financialization of enterprises.(4)The shareholding of social security fund can alleviate the crowding out impact of enterprise financialization on enterprise innovation investment and main business investment,and promote enterprises to move from virtual to real.This thesis provides a new research Angle for the study of the impact of social security fund holdings on the financialization of enterprises,explores the attributes of the market-oriented quasi-fiscal policy of social security fund holdings,rather than treating them as ordinary long-term institutional investors,and also expands and studies the transmission channels and further economic consequences of the impact of social security fund on the financialization of enterprises.This thesis demonstrates the boosting effect of social security fund shareholding on the long-term and healthy development of enterprises,and provides theoretical support for the government to formulate reasonable policies to promote social security Fund to actively enter the market,give full play to the governance ability of social security fund and the role of "capital market direction standard".