Research On Channel Intrusion Decision-making Of Competitive Suppliers Under Asymmetric Transaction Informatio

Supplier channel intrusion is when a supplier uses the sales power that the supplier has to sell directly to downstream customers,in addition to selling through intermediate distributors.In this paper,under the condition of asymmetric transaction information,the threshold conditions for channel intrusion of competing suppliers are studied.Multistage dynamic game sums and inverse recursion methods are used to model and solve the optimal decisions of suppliers and retailers.First,the secondary supply chain composed of a supplier invasion,a supplier does not invade and a retailer is studied,and the retailer makes ordering decisions by knowing the different quotation information of the two suppliers,while the invading supplier competes with the non-invading supplier and the retailer by introducing direct sales channels,and portrays the optimal invasion decision under different channel substitution rates and sales costs of direct sales channels,and discusses the changes in the profits of enterprises at each node of the supply chain when introducing direct sales channels with no suppliers.Studies show that when the cost of sales and channel substitution rate of direct sales channels are within the appropriate threshold range,invading suppliers will improve their own revenue;If you do not invade the supplier,you will lose your own revenue due to the invasion of your opponent;Under certain conditions,the intrusion of suppliers can benefit retailers and the entire supply chain.Finally,numerical analysis verifies the correctness and validity of the theory.Second,the secondary supply chain composed of two intruding suppliers and a single retailer with different invasion costs is studied,and the channel substitution rate and direct sales channel sales cost threshold that meet the simultaneous invasion of two suppliers are solved,and the optimal decision of each node enterprise in the supply chain is solved within the threshold range.On this basis,the changes of profits of enterprises at each node of the supply chain when two suppliers are invaded at the same time and there is no supplier invasion or a single supplier is discussed.The results show that when the sales cost and channel substitution rate of direct sales channels belong to the appropriate threshold range,compared with the profits of each node of the supply chain without invasion,the invading supplier can improve its own revenue from the channel invasion,and the supply chain can also improve its own revenue from the supplier invasion,but it is always unfavorable to the retailer;Compared with the profits of each node of the supply chain in the case of a single-supplier invasion,the invading supplier can improve its own revenue from the channel invasion,and the supply chain can also improve its own revenue from the supplier invasion,but it is always unfavorable to the retailer.Finally,numerical analysis verifies the correctness and validity of the theory.