Research On Logistics Service Supply Chain Decision-making Considering Cross-shareholding And Fairness Concern

With the rapid development of e-commerce,logistics service has gradually become an important force to promote the development of the global economy.The roles of supply chain members also change accordingly.Logistics enterprises with information and resource advantages are transformed into logistics service integrators,while express delivery enterprises that improve basic logistics services are transformed into logistics service providers,and both sides work together to meet customer logistics service needs and achieve value creation.In this situation,the cross-shareholding of logistics service supply chain enterprises will inevitably affect the decisionmaking and performance level of the supply chain.At the same time,when cross-shareholding behavior changes the members’ profits,supply chain members will be affected by fairness concerns,and modify their decision-making behaviors,and finally make the satisfactory decision.In this case,it is of great significance to optimize the logistics service supply chain decision of supply chain members.Therefore,based on the existing order allocation mechanism,this paper studies the impact of different shareholding models and fairness concerns on the decision-making and performance of logistics service supply chain.First of all,considering a supply chain composed of a logistics service integrator and two logistics service providers.The optimal decision and performance of supply chain enterprises are obtained in three cases: decentralized decision without shareholding,decentralized decision by logistics service integrator with shareholding,decentralized decision by logistics service provider with shareholding.This paper analyzes and compares the optimal decision-making and performance of enterprises in different situations,as well as the impact of shareholding and some parameters on supply chain decision-making and performance,and demonstrates the relevant research conclusions through example analysis.The study found that increasing the shareholding ratio of logistics service providers can improve the supply chain decision-making level,while the integrator increasing the shareholding ratio will reduce the supply chain decision-making level,and the supply chain decision-making level of the former is higher than that of the latter.Different shareholding modes have opposite effects on integrators’ profits,and integrators’ shareholding will increase their own profits.When certain conditions are met,integrator shareholding will reduce the profit level of suppliers who do not participate in shareholding,while supplier shareholding will improve the profit level of competitors and produce "free riding" effect.Secondly,under the order allocation mechanism,we construct a Stackelberg game model of horizontal shareholding of logistics service providers.We study the impact of fairness concern and shareholding ratio on the optimal decision-making and profit of supply chain under the three cases,including fairness neutrality,peer-induced fairness concern and vertical distribution fairness concern of suppliers.The study found that the horizontal shareholding ratio will increase the decision-making level of the supply chain and increase the integrator’s profit when certain conditions are met,but it is not necessarily beneficial to the supplier.Both fairness concerns will reduce the supply chain decision-making level and damage the integrator’s profit,which is opposite to the impact of shareholding on the supply chain.When certain conditions are satisfied,shareholding will increase the supply chain decision-making deviation in the case of fairness concern and equity neutrality.When considering peer-induced fairness concerns,the impact of equity concerns on suppliers’ profits depends on the degree of equity concerns.When considering vertical distribution equity concerns,the impact of equity concerns on supplier profits depends on the integrator’s unit profit level and shareholding ratio.