Study On The Role Of Insurance Participation On Surplus Quality From The Perspective Of Listed Company Governance

In the context of modern enterprise proxy system,surplus management is common in listed companies,i.e.the management uses profit manipulation to optimize performance for personal gain,which increases the operational and financial risks of the company,so investors are increasingly concerned about the quality of surplus,which reflects the authenticity and reliability of corporate earnings,and a good corporate governance structure can effectively improve its surplus quality.Insurance companies,as institutional investors,can effectively reduce the information asymmetry between financial institutions and the real industry and improve the surplus quality of the companies they participate in through their participation in listed companies by playing the functions of reputation guarantee and risk control,which is manifested as a certain corporate governance role.Based on previous research,this thesis first defines insurance equity participation,its economic consequences and surplus quality,then sorts out the relationship between insurance equity participation,surplus quality and internal corporate governance,and derives the impact mechanism of insurance equity participation on surplus quality based on corporate network theory,internalization theory and information asymmetry theory.In terms of empirical evidence,the impact of insurance participation on the surplus quality of A-share listed companies is examined by using the data of A-share non-financial listed companies from2016 to 2020,with the surplus quality calculated by the modified Jones model as the explanatory variable and whether insurance companies participate in shares and their shareholding ratio as the explanatory variables,and on this basis,the impact of insurance companies’ participation on the surplus quality of A-share listed companies is investigated.On this basis,we investigate the effect of insurance company shareholding on the surplus governance of companies with low equity balance and poor internal control.The empirical results show that companies with insurance participation have higher surplus quality,and the surplus quality increases with the shareholding ratio,while the surplus governance effect of insurance companies is better for companies with low equity balance and poor internal control.Finally,the paper makes policy recommendations at three levels: the law,the insurance company and the listed company in which it participates.