| After the completion of the reform of non-tradable shares,private placement has become the most important way of equity refinancing for listed companies in China due to its many advantages.However,the discount rate of private placement of listed companies in China generally reaches 20%-50%,while the threshold of investment amount of private placement is always high.As a result,some big shareholders dilute the equity of minority shareholders or transfer interests by manipulating the price of private placement,and causing principal-agent problems.Institutional investors in order to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard,will actively participate in the supervision and management of the company,venture capital as a typical external institutional investors,invested in enterprise earlier and it’s familiar with the enterprise internal situation so venture capital can agree with small and medium shareholders’ interests and give play to effect of certification and supervision effect,alleviate information asymmetry,reduce information costs,thereby reducing the discount rate of private placement.This paper selected the listed companies on GEM in China have been implemented private placement events from 2015 to 2021 as the sample,finds that a non-state background,low reputation venture capital can significantly reduce the discount rate of private placement.Venture capital can play certification and supervision effect,but can’t play reputation effects.In order to study the mechanism,this paper distinguishes enterprises’ issuing mode and finds that in the pricing issue mode,venture capital can reduce the internal and external information asymmetry of enterprises,so as to play the certification supervision effect,but the participation of big shareholders in the private placement will inhibit the positive role of venture capital in reducing the discount rate of private placement.In the bidding issue mode,venture capital can’t play a role by reducing internal and external information asymmetry,but the participation of big shareholders sends a positive signal to the market.What’s more,this paper finds that the loosening of relevant regulations on private placement in 2020 significantly inhibits the positive effect of venture capital in reducing the discount rate of private placement.Finally,this paper tests the robustness of the above conclusions and gives three policy suggestions: attaching importance to post-investment management for venture capital;using subjective initiative for small and medium investors and perfecting supporting policies and measures for supervision department. |
