Research On The Pricing Of Paid-for-knowledge Products Based On Consumers’ Strategic Behaviors

The technological empowerment of the Internet unleashes the need for Knowledge-providers to realize the cognitive surplus,triggering a wave of information expression for the whole people,which brings about a host of growth in knowledge and information.The problem of knowledge gap between information abundance and lack of consumer attention has given birth to the rapid development of payment for knowledge.The perishability of the perceived value of knowledge products and the uncertainty of consumer utility lead to strategic behavior of consumers,that is,consumers will comprehensively consider the price reduction expectations of knowledge products to choose the timing of purchase strategies,and promise pricing as a response to consumers.As an effective mean to to respond to consumers strategic behavior,is price commitment still applicable in the context of Internet knowledge product transactions?Subscription pricing is a relatively common pricing mechanism for information products,which is favored by knowledge providers with its “scale effect” and“stickiness effect”.But unlike traditional knowledge products,Internet knowledge transactions are based on digital products that are aggregated by information flows as the carrier.The granulation of knowledge products makes it possible for the knowledge transaction model of “knowledge segmentation” and “knowledge supermarket”.However,different knowledge payment models will cause consumers to have different cost perceptions.Faced with consumer strategic behavior and psychological cost,how should knowledge providers choose between subscription pricing,on-demand pricing,and hybrid pricing? How to price knowledge-products after choosing a pricing mechanism?From the perspective of dual knowledge,different types of knowledge products will show different knowledge market states.This paper will discuss the pricing of knowledge products under the monopoly environment and the duopoly competition environment of incomplete competition.The following conclusions are obtained through model analysis:(1)In the context of knowledge monopoly,providers should choose a hybrid pricing mechanism.The subscription pricing mechanism and the on-demand pricing mechanism complement each other to achieve complete price discrimination for light users and secondary price discrimination for heavy users.Providers should implement price commitments to prevent consumers from delaying purchases due to expected price drops and harming the provider’s income.(2)In the context of knowledge competition,duopoly knowledge providers should adopt differentiated pricing mechanisms to acquire different types of users and avoid competition with the same group of users.The price of knowledge products is related to the psychological cost of consumers,the discount factor,and the perceived value.Whether the provider makes price commitments is related to the psychological cost of consumers.When the psychological cost is low,the provider should “see the wind and make the rudder” to cater to consumers’ price reduction expectations.When the psychological cost is high,the provider should “consistently” insist on a fixed price to avoid consumers’ strategic waiting behavior.(3)The price of knowledge products is related to the factors like consumer psychological costs,discount factors and perceived value.Therefore,the pricing of Internet knowledge products is also inseparable from the product-centric and user-centric logic.Providers should uphold the spirit of craftsmanship and increase the value of knowledge products.In addition,providers also need to place value on the behavioral characteristics of knowledge consumers.