| In the perfect capital market hypothesis,the cost of capital inside and outside the firm is the same and therefore can be substituted for each other.In the real capital market,due to information asymmetry and agency problems,the external capital cost of enterprises is higher than the internal capital cost,and enterprises cannot use external funds freely,resulting in financing constraints.In the environment of China’s capital market,compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises have the problems of narrow financing channels,poor financing environment and high financing cost,and are faced with more severe financing obstacles than state-owned enterprises.In the process of enterprise financing,the investor will evaluate the operation of the enterprise and set the rate of return according to the capital risk assessed by the investor.The internal situation of the enterprise has become an important basis for investors to evaluate.Internal control,as an important part of the internal governance of the company,is the cornerstone for the effective operation of the enterprise and the stable and rapid development of the enterprise in the future.High-quality internal control ensures a good internal environment of the company and releases positive signals of good and low risk of the company.Giving external investors confidence in enterprise development can reduce the degree of internal and external information asymmetry.Therefore,good internal control quality can help enterprises alleviate financing constraints.Ownership structure is the basis of a company’s framework.Proper ownership structure promotes shareholders’ attention to the company,and shareholders’ participation limits the management’s pursuit of self-interest and reduces the possibility of agency problems.Provide good internal conditions for internal control to alleviate financing constraints.Based on the above analysis,this paper studies the relationship between the quality of internal control and financing constraints,and introduces the equity structure to study its regulating effect between the quality of internal control and financing constraints.In this paper,A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchanges from 2016 to 2021 are selected as samples.Based on financing constraints.In this paper,A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchanges from 2016 to 2021 are selected as samples.Based on information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory and sequencing financing theory,cash-cash flow sensitivity model is adopted to measure the degree of financing constraints,hypotheses are proposed,regression models are constructed,and regression and analysis are carried out.After empirical research,this paper mainly draws the following conclusions:the quality of internal control is significantly negatively correlated with the degree of enterprise financing constraints,and non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises without equity incentives face more serious financing constraints;Equity concentration degree,equity incentive degree and internal control quality significantly positive correlation,equity balance degree and internal control quality significantly negative correlation;Ownership concentration has a significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between internal control quality and financing constraint degree.Equity balance degree and equity incentive degree have significant positive moderating effect on the relationship between internal control and financing constraint degree.Finally,according to the research conclusions,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions for enterprises to alleviate financing constraints from the aspects of internal control and ownership structure. |