Does Tax Credit Rating Disclosure Have Effect On Enterprise Inefficient Investment?

The 20 th CPC National Congress stressed that the focus of economic development should be on the real economy,deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises,accelerated the optimization and structural adjustment of the layout of the state-owned economy,and promoted the development of the state-owned enterprises.Promote the spirit of entrepreneurship,optimize capital allocation,solve the problem of self-circulation and idling of a large amount of funds in the financial system,and promote the efficient development of private enterprises.Guided by the spirit of the 20 th National Congress,promoting the high-quality development of enterprises and accelerating the improvement of their core competitiveness are inseparable from the optimization of enterprise investment structure.At present,China’s economy is developing rapidly,and inefficient investment by enterprises exists from time to time.Inefficient investment means that the actual investment expenditure of the enterprise is not equal to the optimal investment level,mainly including over investment and under investment.Studies have proved that capital shortage,agent problems and information asymmetry are important factors affecting the inefficient investment of enterprises.Second,government intervention,such as property rights mechanism,industry regulation,capital market intervention,fiscal and taxation policies,etc.,will also affect the investment efficiency and optimal resource allocation of enterprises.Since 2014,China has introduced a tax credit rating disclosure policy,compared with the previous mandatory tax collection and management,the tax credit rating disclosure policy is verified annually for the tax payment of all taxpayers,and the credit rating is carried out,and the legal tax payment of enterprises is encouraged by giving A-level taxpayers more convenience to flexible tax collection and management.On the one hand,this inhibits the tax avoidance behavior of enterprises,alleviates the problem of entrusted agency,and also reduces the information manipulation based on tax avoidance of enterprises,improves the transparency of enterprise accounting information,alleviates information asymmetry,and brings more financing opportunities to enterprises,which may inhibit inefficient investment of enterprises.In view of this,this paper uses the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in China from 2011 to 2019 as a research sample,adopts the method of combining normative and empirical analysis,relies on the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,and uses the double difference model to explore how tax credit rating disclosure affects the inefficient investment of enterprises,and further explores the mechanism role of tax avoidance and accounting information transparency between the two.At the same time,this paper also tests the moderating effect according to the agency cost and financing constraints of enterprises.Finally,in order to further verify the reliability of the empirical results in this paper,a series of robustness tests are carried out,such as parallel trend test,propensity score matching test,sample reduction method,and replacement of explanatory variables.This paper concludes that first,tax credit rating disclosure can significantly inhibit inefficient investment by enterprises;Second,tax credit rating disclosure curbs inefficient investment by inhibiting corporate tax avoidance and improving the transparency of accounting information;Third,the higher the agency cost and financing constraint of an enterprise,the more obvious the policy effect of tax credit rating disclosure on the enterprise’s inefficient investment.Finally,based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward policy recommendations and future research prospects.The research conclusion of this paper is helpful to understand whether the tax credit rating disclosure system will affect and how to affect the inefficient investment of enterprises,and further mechanism analysis is carried out by including corporate tax avoidance and accounting information transparency,which enriches the research perspectives and literature in related fields,verifies the impact of flexible tax collection and management represented by tax credit rating disclosure on the investment efficiency of enterprises,and puts forward a series of policy suggestions,such as improving tax credit legislation at the government level,improving the joint incentive and punishment mechanism,Dynamic adjustment of tax credit evaluation indicators,etc.;At the enterprise level,it should improve the internal management mechanism,improve the quality of financial disclosure,and enhance the initiative to pay taxes according to law.The research conclusions of this paper help to understand whether tax credit rating disclosure can inhibit inefficient investment by reducing corporate tax avoidance and reducing corporate information manipulation based on tax avoidance.At the same time,the role of principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory in enterprise inefficient investment is also verified.Through the path of "tax avoidance-agency cost" and "improving enterprise information transparency-alleviating information asymmetry",this paper discusses how tax credit rating disclosure inhibits the non-investment efficiency of enterprises,which can enrich the research perspective of existing literature.In addition,tax credit rating disclosure encourages taxpayers to pay taxes according to law from the perspective of incentives,and is regarded by many scholars as an important representative of flexible tax collection and management.This paper uses the double difference model to verify the impact of tax credit rating disclosure on enterprises’ inefficient investment,which can further enrich the research on the impact of tax collection and management on enterprises’ inefficient investment,and provide a basis for China’s tax collection and management work and the effect of tax collection and management system reform.