| In the context of the domestic IPO recommendation system,the investment bank,as the core of the issuing market intermediary(the recommendation institution),needs to play the role of gatekeeper in the IPO process,conduct comprehensive and detailed due diligence and guidance on the restructuring of the proposed listed company,so as to make it conform to the norms and requirements of the listed company,and issue objective,accurate and detailed documents to enable the regulatory authorities and potential investors to understand the proposed listed company and make investment judgment.In addition to the reform of the registration system in recent years,the focus of IPO issuance audit has begun to shift to compliance and accuracy of information disclosure.Therefore,the orderly operation of the primary market requires investment banks to perform their duties and play the role of good-looking gatekeepers.This can not be achieved only by the supervision of the regulators on investment banks,but also by the reputation mechanism of investment banks.Under a good reputation mechanism(signal theory: reputation transmits a signal),investment banks with good reputation will carefully select high-quality companies to be listed as their customers in order to achieve long-term sustainable development,so as to strive to maintain their good image in the eyes of investors.Furthermore,in the primary market,the reputation of the investment bank will affect the investment judgment of investors(the performance of the secondary market of the newly listed new shares(within a short period of time)),and the investment bank with good reputation will gain more market share in the future.This article characterizes the reputation of investment banks from two dimensions: professional quality and market share,distinguishing between the reputation establishment period and reputation testing period.Using all A-share stocks newly listed from 2014 to 2021 as research samples,this article empirically tests the relationship between investment bank reputation and IPO inhibition rate,as well as the effectiveness of investment bank reputation mechanisms.It also focuses on the differences in investment bank reputation mechanisms before and after the registration system,The final conclusion is that the reputation of investment banks has not significantly affected the IPO underpricing rate for a long time,but since the registration system,the reputation of investment banks has significantly increased the IPO underpricing rate(in other words,improved the initial listing performance of their underwriting and recommendation listings),and investment banks with high reputation in advance can help them gain more market share in the future,But this assistance is not achieved by improving the quality of the proposed listed companies it sponsors. |
