For a long time,capital market research has been intensely focused on the business performance of enterprises.To maximize the value of enterprises and foster their long-term prosperity,it is essential to enhance their performance.To some extent,good enterprise internal governance positively affects enterprise operating performance.The organizational structure of the enterprise is determined by the ownership structure,which serve as the foundation for internal governance.If there is a flaw in the ownership structure,it will adversely affect the performance and innovation of the company.Therefore,reasonable ownership structure plays an important role in enterprise performance.As an outstanding leader in terms of volume and growth of manufacturing industry,China has become the biggest largest manufacturer by 2022,while competition between manufacturing companies is intensifying.The 20 th CPC National Congress urged that the emphasis of economic development should be placed on the substantial economy,and that a new type of industrialization should be developed quickly.In this respect,manufacturing companies should stick to their own practices,explore efficient ownership structures,and improve corporate governance structures to improve business performance and enhance their competitiveness.This paper,based on the data of manufacturing enterprises from 2013 to 2020,employs “two powers separate theory”,“principal-agent theory” and “information asymmetry theory” as the theoretical foundation.Principal Component Analysis is used for factors extraction,a comprehensive business performance index is constructed,and regression analysis is conducted.An empirical examination of the effect of ownership structure,comprising of ownership nature,ownership concentration and ownership balance,on the business performance of manufacturing enterprises is the core content of this paper.The empirical research results show that ownership concentration has a positive impact on business performance of manufacturing enterprises.For manufacturing enterprises,major shareholders with high ownership concentration have an obvious positive incentive effect on business performance,but not a negative infringement effect.With the increase of the equity checks and balances of other external major shareholders,the company’s operating performance shows a "positive U-shaped" state showing a decline first and then an increase.For enterprises controlled by state-owned property rights,there is an "inverted Ushaped" relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance,while there is a negative correlation between ownership balance and corporate performance.Ownership concentration of enterprises controlled by private property rights has a positive impact on business performance,while ownership checks and balances have a negative correlation with business performance.According to the further regression results of the relationship between ownership nature and corporate performance,different controlling shareholders do have different influences on corporate performance.Specifically,the performance of state-owned enterprises directly under the central government is better than that of state-owned assets management agencies and enterprises controlled by local state-owned enterprises.Local state-owned enterprises are faced with the problem of loose behavior,which leads to lower operating performance;The performance of enterprises with private property rights holding is higher than that of enterprises with state-owned property rights holding,but it is not statistically significant.Accordingly,this paper puts forward the following three countermeasures and suggestions.Formulate targeted equity structure policies and perfect external guarantee mechanism.Maintain a reasonable degree of ownership concentration.Improve the internal checks and balances and supervision mechanism. |