Research On The Influence Of The Lifting Scale Of Restricted Shares On The Company’s Decision To Transfer Shares

The dividend distribution policy of the company has always attracted the attention of investors and is also the key field of academic research.A healthy dividend policy is conducive to investors sharing the development achievements of the company and the long-term operation of the company.However,the preference of Chinese listed companies for cash dividend is significantly different from that of western mature capital markets.The decision of stock swap should play a role of signal transmission and convey the better information of the company’s future development to investors.From the essence of share transfer,share transfer is only the internal adjustment of the company’s owners’ equity,and shareholder wealth will not increase as a result.However,whenever a company launches a high proportion of stock giveaways,it will still be sought after by investors.The premium effect of stock giveaways is actually the use of the price illusion of irrational investors,while the major shareholders of listed companies have obtained huge reduction gains through stock giveaways.With the acceleration of new share issuance and listing in China,the scale of restricted shares is becoming larger and larger.When the second type of agency conflict between the company’s major shareholders and external investors is serious,the shareholders of restricted shares are more willing and able to request the company to transfer before and after the lifting of the ban,so as to cooperate with their high-level shareholding reduction and expropriate the rights and interests of external small and medium investors.Using the data of all A-share listed companies in China from 2011 to 2021 as the research sample,this paper studies the correlation between the lifting scale of restricted shares and the company’s decision to swap shares.This paper measures the scale of the suspension lifting by the proportion of the suspension lifting,and comprehensively investigates the impact of the scale of the suspension lifting on the company’s decision of the share lifting from three perspectives: whether the company has launched a share lifting plan,whether it has launched a high share lifting plan and the specific share lifting proportion.This paper introduces the moderating variable of the second type of agency conflict,measures the second type of agency conflict by the separation degree of the two rights,and explores its impact on the relationship between the lifting scale of restricted shares and the company’s decision to transfer shares.As the explained variable,the company’s stock transfer plan,is measured by three indicators,and the two indicators,whether the company sells shares and whether the company conducts high stock transfer,are binary variables,so the Probit model is adopted.Although the data of the proportion of shares transferred by the company are continuous variables,considering that many observed values are zero,the Tobit model is used for regression.The empirical results show that: first,there is a positive correlation between the lifting scale of restricted shares and the company’s decision to transfer shares;Second,the second type of agency conflict positively moderates the relationship between the lifting scale of restricted shares and the company’s decision to transfer shares.Finally,the robustness of the conclusion is tested from three aspects: the explanatory variable of the proportion of ban lifting is replaced by the market value of ban lifting to measure the scale of ban lifting;Increase the proportion of the explained variable with high transfer;Finally,in order to avoid possible endogeneity problems,the instrumental variable method is used for testing.The results are still significant,indicating that the conclusion of this paper is robust.The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the investigation of the relationship between the lifting scale of restricted shares and the company’s decision to transfer shares from the perspective of the second type of agency conflict,which enriches the perspective of related research.It also has certain practical value.It calls on the regulatory authorities to strengthen the supervision of the behavior of stock transfer of listed companies,identify the transfer scheme with impure motives,and protect the interests of small and medium investors.Call on listed companies to improve the internal governance mechanism,strengthen the discourse power of minority shareholders in the decision-making process of the company,and avoid the collusion of major shareholders and senior executives to expropriate corporate assets;Strengthen investor education,so that small and medium investors realize the nature of sending and transferring stocks,no longer blindly chase after high sending and transferring,establish a rational investment concept.