Negative Externalities Of Platforms And Regulatory Policies From The Perspective Of Two-sided Markets

The advancement of mobile communication technology driven by big data and the development of Internet business models have stimulated potential commercial catering demand,making the "instant delivery" service of takeaway loved and respected by the public,but the increasing demand for takeaway catering is likely to cause serious negative externalities problems to society,such as environmental pollution and rider violations.These issues have not only triggered consumer concerns,but also attracted the attention of government regulators.For example,in January 2020,the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the National Development and Reform Commission issued an " Opinion on Further Strengthening the Treatment of Plastic Pollution " and a notice issued by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in January 2021 " Notice on Doing a Good Job in Protecting the Rights and Interests of Workers in Severe Cold Weather " made relevant provisions.However,as a ’ new thing ’,there is no systematic and mature theoretical research on the negative externalities of takeaway platforms,and there is no rich policy practice experience.Therefore,it is very meaningful to study how to solve the negative externalities of takeaway platforms through supervision.This paper first mainly sorts out the research status of the supervision of negative externalities of takeaway platforms at home and abroad,systematically sorts out the theoretical development of negative externalities solutions,and discusses in detail the literature related to this paper in the bilateral market,focusing on the analysis and comparison from the three perspectives of bilateral market,bilateral market control and bilateral market taxation,and more clearly shows the innovation of the research in this paper.Then,this paper focuses on the basic models of Rochet and Tirole(2003)and Armstrong(2006),starting from the perspective of platform pricing taxation and takeaway packaging material taxation,respectively,to study the problem of negative externalities of takeaway under the monopoly market and the competitive duopoly market structure,and conduct a comparative static analysis of the welfare effect in different market structures on the basis of equilibrium.In the third chapter,based on the basic model of Rochet and Tirole(2003),a specific negative externality parameter is added,and the platform pricing is taxed.By comparing the equilibrium solution obtained by mathematical derivation with the solution of social welfare maximization,the impact of taxation on the negative externality of the takeaway market under the monopoly market structure is studied.Through the theoretical model,it is found that:(1)taxing the monopoly takeaway platform merchants,with the increase of tax revenue,the negative externalities of the platform can be improved,but the cost is the loss of the efficiency of market resource allocation,that is,the welfare of all participants in the market will decrease to varying degrees;(2)In the monopoly takeout platform,the size of negative externalities generated by a single take-out transaction is crucial in the impact of tax on market efficiency and negative externalities.When the level of negative externalities is small,any tax levied on businesses,efficiency losses will be greater than the improvement of negative externalities,resulting in a decline in total social welfare.When the level of negative externality exceeds a certain extent,the improvement effect of reasonable tax on negative externality will be greater than the damage to the surplus of market participants,and the overall social welfare level will rise.However,it should be noted that if the level of negative externalities is too large,the government may take heavy taxes to correct market failures.At this time,the takeaway platform has the risk of extinction,which also sounds the alarm for the development of the takeaway platform itself.The fourth chapter focuses on the basic model of Armstrong(2006),and studies the impact of taxation on the negative externalities of the takeaway market in the duopoly competition market from the perspective of taxation on takeaway packaging materials.The results show that:(1)in the duopoly competitive market,take-out packaging materials tax,when the tax intensity is low,businesses will not choose environmentally friendly materials,then not only the negative externalities can not be resolved,but also damage the platform businesses and consumers self-interest.However,as long as the tax intensity reaches a certain level,merchants will give up the use of cheap nonenvironmental packaging materials and choose to use expensive environmental packaging materials.It can be seen that whether the government adopts tax depends on the measurement of economic efficiency and environmental protection;(2)From the model conclusion of the duopoly competitive market,it can be found that when the gap between the cost of environmentally friendly packaging materials and the cost of nonenvironmentally friendly packaging materials continues to narrow,the tax burden of controlling negative externalities will also be reduced accordingly,and the efficiency loss to the market will also be reduced accordingly.The fifth chapter combines the above-mentioned mathematical model analysis of regulatory policies,relying on relevant economic knowledge and practical basis,and proposes corresponding policy recommendations.The main recommendations are:(1)improve the laws and regulations related to environmental taxes,environmental taxes may be considered into the take-out industry;(2)Increase investment in environmentally friendly packaging materials,and strive to reduce the cost of using environmentally friendly materials;(3)Strengthen the control of takeaway packaging pollution data and rider traffic violation data of takeaway platforms.The innovations of this paper may be:(1)Based on the basic model of Rochet and Tirole(2003),the specific negative externality parameter is added to study the negative externality effect of tax on the monopoly takeaway market;(2)Based on the basic model of Armstrong(2006),considering the cost of takeaway packaging,the negative externalities of taxation on the duopoly competition takeaway market are studied;(3)It provides specific and operable policy recommendations for the governance of takeaway platforms.