Research On The Innovation Impact Of Digital Platform M&A And Antitrust Review

In recent years,with the continuous development of the global digital economy,large digital platforms have achieved rapid development of enterprises through mergers and acquisitions and set off a wave of global mergers and acquisitions.At the same time,the market monopoly problem caused by large-scale mergers and acquisitions of large platforms has become increasingly prominent,which not only poses a serious threat to market competition,but also is not conducive to the long-term effective development of the digital platform industry.Distinguished from the characteristics of traditional M&A,digital platform M&A often does not affect the price but mainly affects innovation.Therefore,the analysis and review of innovation competition of digital platforms will become the focus of the field of digital M&A.At the same time,the target of digital platform M&A is mainly targeted at potential competitive start-ups.In particular,the killer M&A of digital platforms is also the core problem faced by countries in the design of M&A control policies.Therefore,this paper mainly studies the innovation impact of digital platform M&A in the existing market and potential competitive market,as well as the anti-monopoly review of the damage of digital platform M&A innovation.Analysis of the innovation impact of market monopoly after the merger and acquisition of digital platforms.Under the monopoly market structure after M&A,the change of market innovation R&D will completely depend on the change of R&D investment of internal enterprises participating in M&A.The unilateral innovation effect of digital M&A may become the main channel to damage innovation.At the same time,the direct network effect of digital platforms and the spillover effect of innovation may change the innovation R&D investment and social welfare of enterprises.We will focus on exploring the changes in innovation R&D of enterprises before and after M&A.The analysis results of this paper show that the unilateral innovation effect of M&A will damage the innovation of the M&A platform and the overall market.The reduction of innovation costs caused by the data-driven network effect may stimulate innovation and mitigate the innovation damage caused by the unilateral innovation effect.In addition,considering the inhibition effect of innovation spillovers on innovation input,innovation spillovers are eliminated after M&A to stimulate innovation and benefit consumers.Therefore,when reviewing M&A innovation,antitrust authorities should pay attention to the review of unilateral innovation damage,data complementary efficiency and innovation spillover effect.Analysis of the innovation impact of oligopoly competition after the acquisition of digital platforms.Under the oligopoly competition structure after M&A,M&A will have an impact on external enterprise innovation and the overall market innovation.Expand the content of the previous chapter to consider the changes in the price strategy and consumer welfare of enterprises under the quality differentiation caused by the data complementary efficiency effect of mergers and acquisitions of enterprises,and analyze the impact of mergers and acquisitions on innovation when oligopoly mergers and acquisitions do not completely eliminate innovation spillovers under innovation spillovers,as well as the impact of changes in the number of enterprises in the market on innovation.The analysis results of this paper show that there is a strategic substitution in R&D for the internal and external platforms of M&A under oligopoly competition,and the overall R&D changes in the oligopoly market will depend on the relative strength of unilateral innovation effect and direct network effect under different platform numbers,and under the incomplete elimination of innovation spillovers,M&A can still offset unilateral innovation effect to improve innovation R&D.The innovation effect of digital platform mergers and acquisitions of start-ups.Startups are often potential competitors who have the ability to innovate and enter the market controlled by enterprises and compete effectively with them.Therefore,mergers and acquisitions are likely to hinder market competition and innovation.This paper constructs a tripartite moral hazard model under the condition of information asymmetry to explore the impact of innovation and social welfare under different policy conditions when innovation projects are exogenous,and analyzes the effectiveness of policy measures.The analysis results of this paper show that under the strict M&A policy,it may not be conducive to the entry of innovative projects and restrict the competition in adjacent markets.Under the loose M&A policy,it may lead the incumbent enterprises lacking innovation incentives to implement killer M&A and strengthen their market dominance.When implementing appropriate M&A policies for potential competition and innovation,antitrust authorities need to comprehensively consider the potential market competition damage caused by M&A,cost reduction caused by M&A efficiency effect,expected resource constraints of start-ups,enterprise innovation ability and innovation incentives,and adhere to the principle of case analysis to assess changes in innovation and welfare.The merger and innovation of digital platforms damages the anti-monopoly review.First of all,because it is difficult to define the innovation market,the anti-monopoly authority can conduct innovation review from the relevant elements of innovation factors,which is more conducive to the current anti-monopoly situation.Secondly,the influence channel of M&A on innovation effect has been improved,especially for the analysis of unilateral innovation damage,the innovation transfer rate can be used to measure the strength of commercial theft effect,and the quantitative analysis can be carried out in combination with innovation spillover effect.The overall innovation effect of M&A is classified into three categories: one is the unilateral innovation effect and innovation spillover effect caused by innovation externalities;Second,the effect of demand expansion and profit expansion caused by price factors;Third,the unique efficiency effect of digital platform M&A.In the specific review,it is necessary to comprehensively analyze the overall impact after the positive and negative effects are offset.Thirdly,in the analysis of the innovation effect of potential M&A competitors,the impact assessment of the relevant determinants of innovation effect-substitution effect,complementary efficiency effect,specificity,emerging market size,potential innovation competition and defensive behavior is carried out,which helps the anti-monopoly authorities better evaluate the innovation impact and supplement the potential anti competition assessment.Finally,the overall improvement of M&A innovation review process and law enforcement ideas,and the introduction of price and innovation factors in the evaluation of the final impact of M&A,proposed a composite review standard with dynamic innovation as the main and static price as the auxiliary.As for the innovation anti-monopoly policy of digital platform M&A,our policy recommendations are: first,focus on the negative impact of M&A transactions with unilateral innovation effects on innovation and R&D,and comprehensively evaluate the innovation impact of M&A;The second is to propose appropriate M&A control policies to adapt to different M&A situations,and adhere to the principle of case analysis to evaluate the innovation and welfare changes of M&A to potential competitors;The third is to improve the M&A innovation review policy of digital platforms,and put forward a composite review framework in the M&A competition review,with innovation as the main factor and price as the auxiliary factor.