| In recent years,with the rapid development of the digital economy,the platform has become an important driving force for economic development,but the digital platform has also brought increasingly prominent monopoly problems in the development process,the anti-monopoly of digital platforms has become the focus of attention of various countries.In the anti-monopoly of digital platforms,how to determine whether a platform has a dominant market position,how to review the competitive damage effect of specific acts,and how to take effective relief measures against monopolistic digital platforms,promoting platform competition has become a prominent issue in anti-monopoly law enforcement review.The multi-homing is an important element affecting the competition in the digital platform market,so it has become an important issue that cannot be ignored in the review of anti-monopoly law enforcement.This paper focuses on how the multi-homing structure of users affects the competition and equilibrium outcomes of the digital platform market.Accordingly This article focuses on three questions: How does the multi-homing structure affect platform competition? Switching costs how to influence market competition,platform pricing and welfare level by influencing the multi-homing structure? How does data elements and multi-homing structure affect digital platform market entry? Based on the above problems,this paper is further design multi-homing oriented antitrust policies.The main contents of this paper are as follows.Firstly,the welfare equilibrium analysis of platform market competition under the different multi-homing structure.In this paper,the Hotelling model of duopoly game is used to analyze the platform pricing,profit level and welfare effect under the different multi-homing structure.Combined with the equilibrium results of model reasoning,it is found that the users on both sides multi-homing structure,under which the platform price level is the lowest,the market competition is the most fierce,the social welfare level is the highest,and the higher the degree of multi-homing,the greater the overall social welfare level.In addition,the determination of the platform price structure under the "competitive bottleneck" structure mainly depends on which side of the platform is the "bottleneck" of the user accessing the market,and the platform has a strong market power for the user on the "bottleneck" side,and then charges a high price for the user on that side.Secondly,the impact of the multi-homing structure under the switching cost on the platform market competition is analyzed.In this paper,we construct a two-stage dynamic game model and use reverse induction to analyze the mechanism of switching costs under different multi-homing structures.The results obtained through model analysis can be found that in the platform market competition,the improvement of the switching cost will reduce the level of social welfare,but the impact mechanism of the switching cost under the multi-homing structure is different,and the platform can obtain a higher profit level by increasing the switching cost under the structure of the the users on both sides multi-homing structure and the "competition bottleneck" structure,while for the users on both sides of the single structure,if the network effect in the platform market is large,the improvement of the switching cost will reduce the platform profit.In addition,when the platform market is asymmetrically competing,only the platform with high market share and strong market force has the incentive to increase the switching cost and charge high prices and obtain high profits,while low market share,Weak market power platforms increase switching costs and reduce the price level.Third,the impact of data-driven competition and multi-homing structure on the platform market entry competition.In this paper,we construct a two-stage Hotelling model and use numerical simulation to analyze the mechanism of action between data elements and multi-homing structures.Through the results obtained from numerical simulation analysis,it can be found that data elements and multi-homing structure are important elements affecting the market entry of digital platforms,and the greater the data advantages of the in-place platform,the more difficult it is for the new platform to enter.Moreover,under the different multi-homing structure,there is a difference between the big data advantages of the in-place platform and the relative competitive advantages formed by the advantages of network effects.Under the "competitive bottleneck" structure,the in-place platform has higher absolute market power and relative market power,and it is more difficult for the new platform to enter under this structure.In addition,the right to data portability reduces the competitive advantage of in-place platforms,which in turn facilitates market entry for new platforms.At the same time,the right to data portability can reduce the proportion of platform data sold or used,which is conducive to promoting platform enterprises to strengthen data standard management and promote the healthy development of the platform market.Finally,this paper puts forward general policy recommendations for antimonopoly law enforcement: First,anti-monopoly of digital platforms should take the multi-homing structure as an important review element,and anti-monopoly law enforcement should focus on the "competition bottleneck" structure.Second,the antimonopoly of digital platforms should focus on the prohibition of monopolistic transactions,bundling and tying,loyalty discounts,restrictions on cross platform carrying of user data and other restrictions on competition that increase user switching costs.Third,the anti-monopoly of digital platforms should focus on the data barriers under the "competition bottleneck" structure,actively promote the implementation of the right to data portability,and take the right to data portability as an important policy option. |
