| While the dual-class share structure is booming in the European and American capital markets,China is also steadily carrying out the pilot of the dual class share structure in the Science and Technology innovation board and growth enterprise Board,in order to inject vitality into the development of companies through the dual-class share structure.At the same time,the issue of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized investors is actually put in front of the regulators.Therefore,how to give consideration to the interests of small and medium-sized investors when transplanting the double level share structure in our country’s capital market,the importance of realizing the double level share structure soft landing becomes increasingly prominent.This paper firstly makes theoretical derivation based on principal-agent theory,tunnel behavior theory,dividend agency cost theory,butler theory and R&D investment.Taking Chinese companies listed in Britain and the United States from 2005 to 2021 as a sample,besides analyzing the impact of dual-class share structure on corporate cash dividend payment,The heterogeneity analysis is further carried out based on whether it is controlled by the founder or whether it is high-tech industry.Meanwhile,it explores whether the appropriation of shareholders’ funds and the company’s R&D expenditure play an intermediary role in the influence path.The results show that: 1)Companies with dual-class share structure have lower willingness and level of cash dividend payment than those with single share structure,and the second type of agency problem is more prominent;2)The willingness and level of cash dividend payment of dual-class share structure companies will decrease with the increase of separation degree of company’s control right and cash flow right;3)Heterogeneity analysis: In founder-controlled or high-tech industries,dual-class share structure has a more prominent inhibitory effect on the willingness and level of cash dividend payment;4)Mechanism analysis: It is not found that dual-class share structure significantly increases the level of shareholders’ capital occupation,but companies with dual-class share structure have a higher level of R&D investment than those with single share structure.When the total amount of capital is fixed,companies with dual-class share structure increase R&D investment,which will have a crowding out effect on cash dividend payment.Based on the above conclusions,the suggestions of this paper: 1)Regulators of dual-class share structure companies should formulate targeted dividend policies to protect the R&D investment needs of dual-class share structure companies and prevent them from damaging their growth;2)Punishing special voting shareholders for infringing on small and medium investors should be strengthened to prevent them from harming the interests of outside investors when the dividend payment requirement is relaxed;3)Specify the information disclosure content of dual-class share structure companies,and the information related to special voting shares should be disclosed in detail. |
