Research On The Impact Of Shareholders’ Consensus Action Agreement On Corporate Value

In recent years,with the gradual increase of hostile takeover events in the capital market,shareholders of many enterprises have chosen to sign a concerted action agreement to deal with the risk of hostile takeover.As one of the voting agreements,the signing members can negotiate to deal with the potential hostile takeover,which is conducive to improving the cost and difficulty of the acquirer and protecting the stability of the enterprise’s control.This agreement can give play to the enthusiasm and solidarity of shareholders to participate in corporate governance,help the members of the agreement maintain control,strengthen supervision ability,and then help the management to play the "housekeeper effect" and focus on the decision-making of improving corporate value.However,this behavior may also lead to the "separation of voting rights and cash flow rights" of the actual controller,which may lead to the "tunneling" behavior of the actual controller damaging the enterprise value.Therefore,in practice,shareholders are cautious about whether to adopt the agreement.Therefore,what is the impact on the enterprise value when the shareholders of the company sign the unanimous action agreement? In different internal and external environments,are there any differences in the role of shareholders’ signing the agreement on corporate value? These problems deserve further study.Based on the principal-agent theory,the tunneling theory of major shareholders and the market theory of control rights,this paper studies the effect of shareholders signing the agreement of concerted action on enterprise value.In the research of this paper,the non-state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2020 are taken as the research samples,and the signing of the unanimous action agreement in the IPO prospectus of the sample companies is manually collected and the model is established for empirical test.The empirical results show that corporate shareholders can significantly improve corporate value by signing a concerted action agreement.Further,this paper studies the impact of situational factors such as information transparency,product competition market and legal environment on the relationship between the two.The results show that the positive relationship between shareholders signing the agreement of concerted action and enterprise value is more significant under the conditions of higher information transparency,weaker market competition and better legal environment of enterprises;By examining the mechanism of the relationship between the two,it is found that the innovation ability and agency cost of the enterprise play an intermediary role in the positive relationship between the signing of the agreement of concerted action by the shareholders of the company and the value of the enterprise.Finally,according to the research conclusions of this paper,policy recommendations are put forward from three aspects: advocating shareholders to reasonably sign the agreement on concerted action,enhancing the management’s awareness of information disclosure,and promoting the improvement of laws and regulations related to the agreement on concerted action.The research in this paper has theoretical significance for enriching the research literature on the economic consequences of the concerted action agreement,and also provides a reference for the shareholders of listed companies to reasonably allocate the concerted action agreement according to the current equity arrangement,and the relevant departments to improve the relevant laws and regulations of the concerted action agreement.